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Occupy Copyright: A Law & Economic 
Analysis of U.S. Author Termination Rights 
KATE DARLING† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1933, two high school teenagers came up with the idea 
for a comic book hero with superhuman powers. They labored 
over the design, refined the character’s story, and then 
decided to get their work published. After multiple rejections, 
they finally found a publisher who was willing to purchase 
the exclusive rights to their superhero for $130.1 The first 
comic featuring Superman was published in 1938. Over the 
following years, D.C. Comics2 made millions of dollars on the 
character contrived by these two young men, both of whom 
were reported to be nearly penniless in 1975.3  
In 1976, the United States Congress revised the 
Copyright Act, extending the duration of terms for 
copyrighted works. Additionally, the new law introduced a 
  
† Research Specialist at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Media Lab 
and Fellow at the Harvard Berkman Center for Internet & Society and Yale 
Information Society Project. kdarling@mit.edu. Many thanks to Stefan Bechtold, 
Dan Burk, Guy Rub, Chris Sprigman, the professorship for Law & Economics at 
ETH Zurich, and the participants at the Fourth Annual Searle Roundtable on the 
Law and Economics of Digital Markets for their valuable comments. Special 
thanks to Jeanne Darling and ULTRNX. 
 1. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105-07 
(C.D. Cal. 2008); see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: 
Termination of Copyright Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 399 (2010). 
 2. The 1938 successor of the original publisher, Detective Comics, Inc. See 
Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 911 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 3. See Michael Dean, An Extraordinarily Marketable Man: The Ongoing 
Struggle for Ownership of Superman and Superboy, THE COMICS J., Oct.-Nov. 
2004, at 13, 16. When the story of the poor, bought-out creators started making 
the rounds in the 1970s, Warner Bros. Entertainment (having acquired D.C. 
Comics and, with it, the rights to Superman in 1969), fearing for its reputation, 
proceeded to offer both authors a lifetime pension and healthcare benefits. See 
Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1112-13. 
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termination right for authors4 and their statutory successors. 
Thinking of cases like the above,5 which are widely perceived 
as unfair to the original creators, Congress was interested in 
“safeguarding authors against unremunerative transfers”6 
by allowing them to opt out of their contractual agreements 
after a period of thirty-five years.7 The original Superman 
creators (or in this case, their statutory successors) were thus 
presented the opportunity to renegotiate their payment, or 
completely withdraw the copyright they had assigned to D.C. 
Comics, now owned by massive media conglomerate Warner 
Bros. Entertainment, Inc., effective 2013. Consequently, both 
authors’ estates filed termination notices with the U.S 
Copyright office.8 Legal uproar ensued among the companies 
with financial stakes in Superman, as a first district court 
judgment in 2008 held that the notice was valid.9 Today, it 
remains unresolved what these terminations mean for the 
licenses that D.C. Comics has granted to Time Warner 
covering TV and movie rights, causing confusion among 
investors and fans alike.10 
  
 4. For the purposes of this Article, “author” pertains to any creator of a 
copyrightable work. 
 5. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER 
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 93 (Comm. 
Print 1961) (“The situation in which authors are most likely to receive less than 
a fair share of the economic value of their works is that of an outright transfer for 
a lump sum.”). 
 6. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
 7. Or fifty-six years, for grants prior to 1978. See infra Part I for details. 
 8. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1114 & n.3 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008). Due to the changes made by the 1976 Copyright Act and later the 1998 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act the original copyright term of 56 
possible total years was extended first by nineteen years and then by an 
additional twenty, making it possible for the right successors of the Superman 
creators to retain their rights until this day. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006); see also 
infra note 33. 
 9. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (concerning notice served by the right 
successors of author Jerry Siegel). 
 10. See D.C. Comics v. Pac. Pictures Corp., No. CV 10-3633 ODW (RZx), 2012 
WL 4936588 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2012); Simon Brew, Warner Bros Wins Latest 
Round of Superman Rights Battle, DEN OF GEEK (Mar. 22, 2013), available at 
http://bit.ly/11nHr8v. 
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The case is not a lone exception. Taking advantage of the 
changes made in the 1976 Copyright Act and the copyright 
extensions instated by Congress over the past few decades,11 
authors of copyrighted works can begin terminating their 
copyright assignments as of 2013. Courts will have multiple 
issues to clarify in the legal battles that are about to ensue. 
Despite (or because of) the detailed complexity of the laws 
introduced in 1976,12 they remain obscure to many industry 
participants and have left some looming open questions. 
Courts have yet to decide on issues such as which categories 
of works are subject to termination rights, and how strictly 
to interpret their “inalienability.”13 For this reason, much of 
the discussion surrounding the introduction of author 
termination rights is only now becoming relevant, as the 
period approaches in which courts will begin to establish the 
boundaries of the rules. 
Prior literature has drawn attention to the fact that there 
are already discrepancies in how courts are attempting to 
resolve open issues.14 So far, however, the evaluation of the 
judicial decisions, their outcomes, and how to best proceed 
moving forward, as well as of author termination rights 
generally, is largely focused on establishing and interpreting 
  
 11. Through both the 1976 Copyright Act and the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act. See infra note 33. 
 12. The district court in Siegel remarks on the confusing complexity of the 
laws, saying “[t]he termination provisions contained in the Copyright Act of 1976 
have aptly been characterized as formalistic and complex, such that authors, or 
their heirs, successfully terminating the grant to the copyright in their original 
work of authorship is a feat accomplished ‘against all odds.’” 542 F. Supp. 2d at 
1101-02 (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 7:52 (2007) 
[hereinafter PATRY, COPYRIGHT]). 
 13. The Supreme Court has characterized the wording “notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary” to mean inalienability. See infra note 64 & Part I.E. 
 14. Such as whether there is any room for the parties to contract around 
termination rights, See Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in 
the Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right to Terminate, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1329 (2010) 
[hereinafter Loren, Renegotiating]; Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-
Poohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable” Termination Rights, 57 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S. 799 (2010) [hereinafter, Menell & Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing]; Allison M. 
Scott, Oh Bother: Milne, Steinbeck, and an Emerging Circuit Split over the 
Alienability of Copyright Termination Rights, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357 (2006). 
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legislative intent.15 This Article contributes to the ongoing 
debates by highlighting the economic issues that could 
influence the outcome of the law in real-world markets. It 
predicts that introducing a termination right will effect price 
changes and risk allocation, essentially creating a lottery 
that rewards a small subset of authors, but reducing 
individual gains for the majority. First of all, this casts 
considerable doubt on the distributive-oriented justification 
for the law, but this Article also discusses why this price and 
risk allocation may not necessarily have a positive effect 
within the general incentive theory underlying copyright 
law. Furthermore, uncertainty, the length of copyright terms, 
and the long time period between right assignments and the 
termination possibility may mitigate the potential for 
positive effects on creation incentives. Finally, this Article 
demonstrates that adverse effects on publisher16 incentives 
may hinder socially desirable investments. It concludes that 
author termination rights as they are currently structured in 
the United States are likely not desirable within a utilitarian 
theory of copyright law.17 
Part I provides a more detailed legal explanation of the 
author termination rights in the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. 
Part II follows with an economic analysis of termination 
rights and their effects. Implications are discussed in Part 
III.  
  
 15. See Loren, Renegotiating, supra note 14, at 1345; Peter S. Menell & David 
Nimmer, Judicial Resistance to Copyright Law’s Inalienable Right to Terminate 
Transfers, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 227 (2010) [hereinafter Menell & Nimmer, 
Judicial Resistance]; Menell & Nimmer, Pooh-poohing, supra note 14, at 811-14. 
Only a few commentators and scholars have raised economic concerns. See Guy 
A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing Schemes in 
Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH 49 (2013). 
 16. For the purposes of this Article, “publisher” pertains to any entity that 
acquires rights from the author for the purpose of disseminating and benefitting 
from the copyrighted work. 
 17. For more on why it makes sense to analyze copyright law from this 
perspective, and also for a discussion of whether there is reason for those who 
argue instead for a wealth-distributive purpose of copyright law to find author 
termination rights undesirable, see infra Part III. 
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I. LEGAL SITUATION 
The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 instated a termination 
right for all authors who enter into a copyright assignment 
or licensing agreement. Although this right officially became 
law on January 1, 1978, its main effects will begin to 
materialize only now, more than three decades later, as 
terms begin to end and the windows in which authors are free 
to make use of their termination rights start to occur. The 
statutory details are as follows. 
A. History 
The Copyright Act of 1909 gave authors two consecutive 
twenty-eight-year terms of copyright, subject to a renewal by 
the author.18 Any rights the author granted to others during 
the first term were at the author’s disposal again at the 
beginning of the second term.19 
In 1912, the famous song “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling,” 
co-written by George Graff, Jr., was registered for copyright 
by music publisher M. Witmark & Sons. Given the first term 
of twenty-eight years, the copyright renewal by the author 
was not going to be possible until around the year 1940. In 
1917, however, Witmark made another agreement with the 
songwriter Graff to secure “all copyrights and renewals of 
copyrights and the right to secure all copyrights and 
renewals of copyrights,” including “any and all rights therein 
that I [Graff] or my heirs, executors, administrators or next 
of kin may at any time be entitled to.”20 When the first term 
was up, however, both publisher Witmark and songwriter 
Graff filed for copyright renewal. Subsequently, Graff 
assigned his copyright for the renewal term to publisher Fred 
Fisher Music Co., which began selling its own copies of 
“When Irish Eyes Are Smiling.” In the resulting legal case, 
  
 18. See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). This dual term of 
copyright can be traced back as far as the Statute of Anne from 1709. See 
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970)); 8 Anne, c. 19. 
 19. See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 14 (1909) (explaining the reasoning behind 
this). 
 20. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 645 (1943). 
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Fisher and Graff contended that the original 1917 
assignment of the copyright renewal right to Witmark was 
void because it went against the intent of the law.21 
In 1943, the Supreme Court ruled in Fisher v. Witmark 
that an assignment to assign his renewal, made by an author 
in advance of the twenty-eighth year of the original term of 
copyright, is valid and enforceable.22 It argued: “If an author 
cannot make an effective assignment of his renewal, it may 
be worthless to him when he is most in need. Nobody would 
pay an author for something he cannot sell.”23 This precedent 
established alienability of the copyright renewal rights 
before they had vested.24 It thus became common for 
publishers to have authors sign over their renewal rights 
along with the original copyright assignment.25 Many argued 
that this decision essentially undermined the original intent 
of the law, which was to give authors a second chance to 
capitalize on their works later in time.26 
In 1976, the Copyright Act (effective date 1978)27 
abolished the dual copyright term, granting instead a single, 
longer copyright for a total of the author’s life plus fifty 
years.28 The statute also newly introduced a termination 
  
 21. See id. at 647; see also H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 14 (1909) (“It not 
infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher 
for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success and lives 
beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the 
exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be 
framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that right.”). 
 22. Fred Fisher Music Co., 318 U.S. at 657-59. 
 23. Id. at 657. 
 24. Melville B. Nimmer, Termination of Transfers under the Copyright Act of 
1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947, 951 (1977). 
 25. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER 
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 93 (Comm. 
Print 1961) (“It has become a common practice for publishers and others to take 
advance assignments of future renewal rights.”) 
 26. See id. at 53 (“[T]he reversionary purpose of the renewal provision has been 
thwarted to a considerable extent”); see also Nimmer, supra note 24, at 951. 
 27. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2541-2602 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)). 
 28. Id. at 2572 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976)). 
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right for authors.29 The House Committee Report explains the 
legislative concept of “safeguarding authors against 
unremunerative transfers.”30 The 1961 Report of the Register 
of Copyrights contains the following paragraph: 
It has been argued that most authors do not need or want to be 
treated as incompetent to handle their business affairs. Many of 
them have banded together in organizations which negotiate 
standard contracts providing for continuing royalties. Their 
assignments can be and often are given for limited periods of time. 
It is still true, however, that most authors are not represented by 
protective organizations and are in a relatively poor bargaining 
position. Moreover, the revenue to be derived from the exploitation 
of a work is usually unpredictable, and assignments for a lump sum 
are still common. There are no doubt many assignments that give 
the author less than his fair share of the revenue actually derived 
from his work. Some provision to permit authors to renegotiate 
their disadvantageous assignments seems desirable.31 
It seems that the Copyright Register was thus indeed 
concerned with the type of case as illustrated in the 
introduction, where authors of copyrighted works are bought 
out by a small lump fee. 
There are two provisions governing termination rights, 
one for copyright grants made prior to the effective date of 
the 1976 Copyright Act (1978), and one for copyright grants 
made after the law came into effect. These two provisions and 
their differences are described in more detail in the following. 
B. Copyright Grants Made Prior to 1978 
In 1976 and in 1998, the United States Congress enacted 
two copyright term extensions.32 Termination rights were 
thus extended to include the additional term of protection. 
  
 29. Id. at 2569, 2574 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c)). 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
 31. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER 
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 54 (Comm. 
Print 1961). 
 32. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006)); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
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Section 304 of the Copyright Act provides that licenses or 
transfers of copyright that were entered into before January 
1, 1978, are subject to termination “during a period of five 
years beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date 
copyright was originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 
1978, whichever is later.”33 Because copyright was extended, 
section 304 permits authors and their statutory successors to 
claim part of the value inherent to the extension of the 
copyright term. 
The termination right is limited in terms of eligible 
parties and timeframe.34 Only authors themselves or, should 
the author be deceased, the author’s statutory successors can 
terminate the copyright grant.35 Terminations are not 
automatic. In order for a termination to be effective, action is 
required on the part of the terminating party.36 Notice of 
termination must be given a maximum of ten and a minimum 
of two years before the termination date.37 The effective date 
of termination must be “during a period of five years 
beginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright 
was originally secured.”38 If no termination is made within 
the given time frame, the grantee can continue to exploit the 
work according to the original contract for the remainder of 
the copyright term.39 
  
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, sec. 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006)). 
 33. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3) (2006). 
 34. See other regulations issued by the Copyright Office at 37 C.F.R. § 201.10 
(2009). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1). Section 304(c)(1) establishes that a termination can 
be executed by at least one-half of successors that own and are entitled to the 
right as per section 304(c)(2). 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1). For more details on the 
statutory successors, see infra Part II.D. 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4). 
 37. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(A). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3). 
 39. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(F). Or for however long was originally agreed to by 
the parties. It is the norm in most publishing industries to assign copyright for 
the entire possible (or even conceivably possible) extent and duration. See, e.g., 
Alan H. Kress, in 8 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS: NEGOTIATING AND 
DRAFTING GUIDE 159-84 (Donald C. Farber & Peter A. Cross eds., 2008), form 159-
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Unlike terminations under section 203 of the Copyright 
Act, which, as discussed below, are limited to grants made by 
the author, the section 304 termination right applies to pre-
1978 transfers made by both authors and authors’ statutory 
successors.40 Termination rights apply to outright transfers, 
as well as any type of license (exclusive or non-exclusive).41 
They do not, however, apply to works made for hire.42  
C. Copyright Grants Made After 1978 
Because the 1976 Copyright Act eliminated the copyright 
term renewal period43 and created a single, longer term for 
copyright (life of the author plus fifty years,44 then later 
seventy years45), section 203 of the Copyright Act provides a 
way for authors or their statutory successors to terminate a 
grant after thirty-five years.46 This essentially replaces the 
function of the author’s previous renewal opportunity, in 
order to “safeguard[ ] authors against unremunerative 
transfers.”47 Section 203 allows for termination “during a 
period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years 
  
1; Dionne Searcey & James R. Hagerty, Lawyerese Goes Galactic as Contracts Try 
to Master the Universe, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2009, at A1, A18. 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)-(d). For reasoning, see STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 53-54 (Comm. Print 1961); Loren, 
Renegotiating, supra note 14, at 1335-37. 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). 
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)-(d). Or to transfers made through a will. Id. This makes 
sense in that the copyright is seen to originate with the party that receives the 
copyright through will or work made for hire. See Loren, Renegotiating, supra 
note 14, at 1137-39, 1147-48. On the other end, however, since these “transferees” 
are not the original creator, they do not get to benefit from termination rights 
themselves. See id.  
 43. See supra Part I.A. 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976). 
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006), as per the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 46. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).  
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from the date of execution of the grant.”48 
Unlike terminations under section 304, the termination 
under section 203 is limited to grants made by the original 
author only.49 Further transfers of copyright are not subject 
to termination through the transferer.50 Just like 
terminations under section 304, the right to terminate is 
limited to the author or statutory successors51 and must be 
exercised during the time frame of a maximum of ten and a 
minimum of two years before the termination date.52 It 
applies to all types of transfers and licenses,53 but not to 
works-made-for-hire.54 What this means in practice is 
described in the following. 
D. Implications 
To illustrate the mechanics of both types of author 
termination rights, take the case of the Superman creators. 
The original authors Jerome Siegel and Joe Shuster granted 
publisher Detective Comics the copyright to Superman in 
1938.55 Because this was a grant made prior to 1978, their 
termination right is governed by section 304(c), which states 
that “[t]ermination of the grant may be effected at any time 
during a period of five years beginning at the end of fifty-six 
years from the date copyright was originally secured.”56 For 
pre-1978 grants, “‘secured’ means the actual date the work 
  
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012). “[O]r, if the grant covers the right of 
publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the 
date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from 
the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.” Id. 
 49. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 203(a), with 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1). 
 50. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 51. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203 (a)(1)-(2), 304(c)(1)-(2). As with section 304 terminations, 
successors must have a majority interest in order to terminate. 17 U.S.C. §§ 
203(a)(1), 304(c)(1). 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a)(4)(A). 
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
 54. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). Or transfers made through a will. See id. 
 55. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1102-03, 1107 
(C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 56. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3). 
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was first published with notice” or is registered.57 In this case 
the effective termination period is therefore from 1994 to 
1999. Furthermore, termination notice must be given “not 
less than two or more than ten years before” the effective date 
of termination.58 When Jerome Siegel passed away in 1996, 
his termination right automatically moved to his statutory 
successors in accordance with section 304(c)(2), in this case 
his widow and daughter.59 They both served notice of 
termination in 1997, with an effective date two years later, 
in 1999.60  
Had the original Superman grant been executed in 1978, 
rather than 1938, the situation would have been as follows: 
section 203(a)(3) sets the effective termination date “at any 
time during a period of five years beginning at the end of 
thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant;”61 
which in this case would begin in 2013.62 Jerome Siegel’s 
widow and daughter would be able to regain copyright 
ownership any time between 2013 and 2018. What this 
means is that for grants made post-1978, the authors (or 
their statutory successors) are starting to be able to 
effectively terminate their grants under section 203 as of the 
time of this Article. In the few termination cases that have 
already arisen, it is becoming clear that the letter of the law 
  
 57. See PATRY, COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, § 7:43; see also 1 MELVILLE NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.05[B][1] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 
2009). 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (c)(4)(A). 
 59. See Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1113-14. 
 60. Id. at 1114. Although there was much discussion in the resulting case as to 
the exact dates of termination and whether notice was valid, these complications 
are left out of this version, which only serves as an example for the mechanics of 
termination rights. See id. at 1116-24. 
 61. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). “[O]r, if the grant covers the right of publication of 
the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of 
publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date 
of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.” Id. 
 62. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). As with terminations under section 304, the 
authors or their successors must serve notice “not less than two or more than ten 
years before [the effective termination] date.” See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(4)(A), 
304(a)(4)(A). 
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leaves unresolved questions. Some of the most relevant 
issues are described in the following. 
E. Open Questions 
The 1976 law establishes that the termination rights 
under sections 203 and 304 are restricted to the original 
author and their statutory successors63 and do not apply to 
works made for hire.64 Sections 203 and 304 also state that 
the termination rights are valid “notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary.”65 In 1990, the Supreme Court 
characterized this description to mean inalienability of the 
right.66 While the letter of the law may seem fairly simple and 
straightforward, these formalities are subject to a 
considerable range of interpretation by courts in practice.  
For one thing, it has not been entirely clear whether the 
rights to some types of works fall under the work-made-for-
hire doctrine.67 A problematic example of this has been sound 
recordings. Subject to considerable debate, the decision about 
whether or not sound recordings should be categorized as 
works made for hire and thus subject to author termination 
rights has hinged on courts’ interpretation and has massive 
implications for the recording industry in having to deal with 
the effects of the 1976 Copyright Act.68 In coming years, many 
  
 63. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(1)-(2), 304 (c)(1)-(2).  
 64. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)-(b), 304(c). 
 65. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5). 
 66. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990). 
 67. The 1976 Copyright act introduced a new definition of works for hire. 
According to 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), a “work made for hire” is either: “(1) a work 
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work 
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, 
as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a 
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as 
answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a 
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made 
for hire.” Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 9544 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). 
 68. See Corey Field, Their Master’s Voice? Recording Artists, Bright Lines, and 
Bowie Bonds: The Debate Over Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire, 48 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 145 (2000); Randy S. Frisch & Matthew J. Fortnow, 
Termination of Copyrights in Sound Recordings: Is There a Leak in the Record 
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established musicians or their statutory successors will be 
able to attempt termination of right transfers to financially 
valuable works.69 Whether they can do so depends largely on 
the validity of the record companies’ work-made-for-hire 
argument.70 To complicate matters, the definition and 
interpretation of a work-made-for-hire may differ depending 
on whether the work was made prior to 1978 (and thus 
governed by the 1909 Copyright Act), or whether it was made 
later, falling under the stricter definition of the 1976 Act.71 
Patrick Murray looks at the relationship between the work-
made-for-hire doctrine and author termination rights, 
confirming that much of the outcome is subject to court 
interpretation.72 He argues that the question of whether a 
work is “made-for-hire” is central to termination right 
issues,73 and that courts can and should be guided by 
economic considerations that affect the system as a whole.74 
The question of inalienability is also not as clear-cut as 
the statute makes it seem. For example, courts are currently 
divided on whether and when agreements between the same 
  
Company Vaults?, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 212 (1993); Abbott Marie Jones, 
Get Ready ‘Cause Here They Come: A Look at Problems on the Horizon for 
Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 127 (2009) [hereinafter Jones, Get Ready]; Mary LaFrance, Authorship 
and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 375 (2002); Ryan 
A. Rafoth, Limitations of the 1999 Work-For-Hire Amendment: Courts Should Not 
Consider Sound Recordings to Be Works-For-Hire When Artists’ Termination 
Rights Begin Vesting in Year 2013, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (2000); Kathryn 
Starshak, Comment, It’s the End of the World as Musicians Know It, or Is It? 
Artists Battle the Record Industry and Congress to Restore Their Termination 
Rights in Sound Recordings, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 71 (2001). 
 69. See Rub, supra note 15, at 129. Including, for example, Bruce Springsteen 
and Billy Joel, among others. See id. 
 70. See id. at 62-63. 
 71. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, § 5.03[B]; see also Playboy Enters., 
Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 72. Patrick Murray, Heroes-For-Hire: The Kryptonite to Termination Rights 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 411 (2013). 
 73. See, e.g., Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985); see generally John 
Molinaro, Who Owns Captain America? Contested Authorship, Work-For-Hire, 
and Termination Rights Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
565 (2004); see also Rub, supra note 15, at 62. 
 74. See Murray, supra note 72, at 424-29. 
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parties are “agreements to the contrary.”75 There have 
already been a few notable cases in which the parties, 
possibly in an attempt to circumvent the inalienability 
restriction, have tried to terminate the original agreement 
and re-enter into a “new” contract in order to effectively 
restart the term. While some courts have cracked down on 
these attempts, declaring them invalid,76 a couple of recent 
cases in the Ninth and Second Circuit have come to more 
lenient conclusions.77 This ambiguity has sparked discussion 
over what “agreement to the contrary” means, and whether 
alienability of termination rights should be allowed under 
certain circumstances.78 Some claim that these cases go 
against the law, effectively “enabling a grantee to renegotiate 
the terms of the grant so as to frustrate recapture by the 
author’s family.”79 It appears to be in the power of the courts 
to interpret the inalienability requirement strictly or not. 
Only very few commentators have looked at the question in 
light of the theory and purpose of U.S. copyright law, in 
particular with regard to economic incentives.80 So far the 
debate over the desirable interpretation of these formalities 
has mainly focused on the reasoning behind the introduction 
of the termination right.81  
Further questions include what types of grants author 
termination rights apply to, in particular whether authors 
  
 75. Armstrong, supra note 1, at 403 n.255. 
 76. See, e.g., Classic Media, Inc. v. Mewborn, 532 F.3d 978, 979-80 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 77. See Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 
2008); Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 78. See, e.g., Menell & Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing, supra note 14, at 827; see also 
Loren, Renegotiating, supra note 14, at 1344. 
 79. See Menell & Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing, supra note 14, at 802. 
 80. See, e.g., Rub, supra note 15 (exploring the justification of U.S. author 
termination rights from an economic perspective); see also infra Part II. 
 81. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REP. OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 
93 (Comm. Print 1961); Loren, Renegotiating, supra note 14; Menell & Nimmer, 
Pooh-Poohing, supra note 14; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). 
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can revoke copyright assignments made under Creative 
Commons or other open-source licenses.82 
These open questions are relevant because their judicial 
interpretation will establish the boundaries of termination 
rights. Near-future decisions in this area will set legal 
precedence for times to come. In ruling over author 
termination right cases, courts have space to influence the 
costs and benefits of the law. For example, courts can be 
swayed by anecdotes of bought-out artists83 and interpret the 
inalienability of termination rights strictly, declaring 
rescissions and copyright re-grants invalid in all cases,84 or 
applying the work made for hire doctrine narrowly.85 Or, 
courts can factor economic awareness and concerns into their 
interpretations, taking the below-addressed issues into 
consideration. The above-discussed open questions are all 
examples of areas where there is considerable judicial 
leeway. More generally, when discussing not only judicative, 
but also which legislative directions to take moving forward, 
having some idea of the potential economic effects of these 
laws is a useful insight.86 Rather than draw on the discussion 
of legislative intent like most of the prior literature,87 the 
following Part therefore looks at the author termination right 
system from an economic perspective.  
  
 82. See Armstrong, supra note 1, at 411; Lydia Pallas Loren, Building a 
Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative Commons 
Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 275 
(2007). 
 83. See, e.g., Sean McGilvray, Judicial Kryptonite?: Superman and the 
Consideration of Moral Rights in American Copyright, 32 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 319, 333-35 (2010). 
 84. See Rub, supra note 15, at 66-67. 
 85. See Murray, supra note 72, at 437 (citing Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 
777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) as a counter-example). 
 86. Although this Article uses judicial interpretation as an example for the 
timely relevance of this research and how it can be useful in practice, see infra 
note 268, the economic analysis is more generally applicable. 
 87. This Article comes back to legislative intent in the discussion of 
implications. See infra Part III. 
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II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
This Part looks at how existing law & economic theory 
applies to author termination rights, in particular in the 
context of contracting and the parties’ investment incentives. 
By instating author termination rights in the 1976 U.C. 
Copyright Act, the United States Congress is essentially 
intervening in the parties’ freedom of contract. Termination 
rights effectively allow one of the parties to a contract to 
terminate at a specific time, regardless of what was originally 
agreed to. Furthermore, this right belongs to only one of the 
parties. The intervention has the explicit purpose of giving 
one party to the contract a renegotiation opportunity.88  
Economic theory on contracts and investment incentives 
predicts a number of standard effects that only a few scholars 
have considered in the discussion surrounding author 
termination rights.89 Guy Rub delivers a rare economic 
analysis, arguing that termination rights are costly and 
unnecessary. Like in the following Part,90 he warns against a 
misallocation of risk between authors and publishers.91 While 
he suggests that termination rights could increase incentives 
to create if their term were shorter, he argues that a tragedy 
of the anticommons problem92 and the cost of risk-shifting 
outweigh the benefits in the all-over tradeoff. This analysis 
concurs with the risk allocation effect. It explores both this 
aspect and the problem of hold-up in more depth. Based on 
economic factors like uncertainty and intertemporality in 
decision-making, it also questions a noticeable effect of 
termination rights on creation incentives.93 This Article also 
  
 88. See supra Part I.A. 
 89. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Music Industry 
Copyright Battle: When is Owning More Like Renting?, FREAKONOMICS (Aug. 31, 
2011), http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/08/31/the-music-industry-copyright-
battle-when-is-owning-more-like-renting.  
 90. See infra Part II.A. 
 91. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 89. 
 92. See Rub, supra note 15, at 75, 118. 
 93. This inquiry is a relevant consideration within the utilitarian function of 
copyright law. The idea of incentivizing creative work is central to U.S. copyright 
theory. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, Economic Foundations of Copyright, in GOLDSTEIN 
ON COPYRIGHT § 1.14 (3d ed. 2008); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, §1.03[A]; 
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explores additional behavioral effects and the role they could 
play in the termination right setting. Aside from the 
standard economic concerns of price changes and risk-
shifting, bounded rationality may have an influence on actor 
incentives and behavior.  
Examining author termination rights from the 
perspective of law & economics can be a helpful tool. While 
there are limitations to economic theory, in particular 
because there may be other factors than efficiency worth 
considering in practice,94 it can be useful to step back and look 
at this type of contracting situation through an economic 
lens. Economic theory can point to relevant effects that may 
not be intuitively obvious to lawmakers. 
The following Parts elaborate on the economic theory 
behind the above-mentioned issues and illustrate how they 
apply in the specific context of author termination rights. 
A. Price Changes and Risk Allocation 
Publishing industries, in other words markets for 
copyright grants, commonly comprise a large number of 
sellers (authors), and a far smaller number of buyers 
(publishers).95 The buyers not only have access to the 
distribution channels necessary to disseminate and market 
the work, but also, importantly, they are in a better position 
to diversify risk. Markets for creative works are 
  
see also Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003); 
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 428 (2002). 
The U.S. Constitution enables copyright laws that grant “[a]uthors . . . the 
exclusive Right to their . . . Writings” in order “[t]o promote the progress of Science 
and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For further discussion of the 
incentives that promote creative works, see infra Part III. 
 94. See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing distribution effects). 
 95. See Alan B. Albarran, Media Economics, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF MEDIA 
STUDIES 291, 296 (John D.H. Downing et al. eds., 2004); Mike Jones, Market 
Research, in 1 CONTINUUM ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR MUSIC OF THE WORLD: 
MEDIA, INDUSTRY AND SOCIETY 554, 555 (John Shepherd et al. eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter Jones, Market Research]; Allen J. Scott, A New Map of Hollywood: 
The Production and Distribution of American Motion Pictures, 36 REGIONAL STUD. 
957 (2002) (providing examples of publisher concentration); Michael Szenberg & 
Eric Youngkoo Lee, The Structure of the American Book Publishing Industry, 18 
J. CULTURAL ECON. 313 (1994). 
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characterized by high uncertainty of future successes and 
failures.96 With only a small portion of creations becoming 
popular and a great many not, making investments in a 
creative work carries significant risk. Publishers, by taking 
on a large number of projects, mitigate the all-over risk by 
distributing it over their entire pool of investments. Because 
authors, for the most part, are in no position to do the same,97 
they have an interest in signing the risk of success or failure 
over to publishers. Furthermore, as discussed in the 
preceding paper in this doctoral thesis, authors are often 
dependent on a source of immediate income, whereas the 
buyers generally are not.98 Sellers are therefore interested in 
exchanging the copyrights to their work for an upfront sum 
of money. 
All of the above is reflected in the fact that pure royalty-
rate contracts are relatively scarce in practice.99 Publishers 
have an interest in purchasing the full transfer of copyright 
for an upfront fee. Royalties will often enter into contracts 
with an author once he or she has become established and 
successful, although even then, profit participation usually 
  
 96. See RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND 
COMMERCE 2-3, 61 (2000); ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 5-6 
(2d ed. 2005); Jones, Market Research, supra note 68, at 555-56; Sarah J. Skinner, 
Estimating the Real Growth Effects of Blockbuster Art Exhibits: A Time Series 
Approach, 30 J. CULTURAL ECON. 109 (2006).  
 97. While it is conceivable that some authors may self-publish a large number 
of works, publishers commonly work with amounts that by far exceed that of an 
individual. 
 98. See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943); 
see also Kate Darling, Contracting About the Future: Copyright and New Media, 
10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 485, 507-08 (2012). 
 99. At least for not yet established artists. See, e.g., ARTHUR DE VANY, 
HOLLYWOOD ECONOMICS: HOW EXTREME UNCERTAINTY SHAPES THE FILM INDUSTRY 
245 (2004); DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC 
BUSINESS 68-88 (7th ed. 2011); Darlene C. Chisholm, Profit-Sharing Versus Fixed-
Payment Contracts: Evidence From the Motion Pictures Industry, 13 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 169, 176-77 (1997) [hereinafter Chisholm, Profit-Sharing]; Menell & 
Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing, supra note 14, at 802 (on record labels and the music 
industry). 
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only makes up part of the remuneration.100 While this 
circumstance could be attributed to bargaining 
disadvantages on the side of authors, it makes economic 
sense to have buy-out contracts for creative works. If buyers 
are willing and able to bear the (high) risks of success and 
failure, while sellers prefer to exchange this risk for 
immediate payment, royalty-rate contracts are not in either 
party’s interest.101 While for established authors the 
uncertainty of the work’s success is reduced on both sides, 
new or less famous authors are a particularly high-risk 
investment.102 For example, a 2007 study by Martin 
Kretschmer and Philip Hardwick looks at earnings of 
authors from copyright, finding that royalty-based income is 
an extremely uncertain source.103 A small subset of authors 
will profit from royalty contracts, while the large part of 
authors will not.104 
In this setting, basic economic theory predicts that 
introducing a termination right for authors will have two 
relevant effects. First, it makes the initial assignment of a 
copyright less valuable to publishers, decreasing the price 
they are willing to pay to authors upfront. Second, this 
  
 100. See DE VANY, supra note 99, at 254; PASSMAN, supra note 99, at 66-68; 
Chisholm, Profit-Sharing, supra note 99, at 176-77; Menell & Nimmer, Pooh-
Poohing, supra note 14, at 802. 
 101. See Christoph Engel & Michael J. Kurschilgen, Fairness Ex Ante and Ex 
Post: Experimentally Testing Ex Post Judicial Intervention into Blockbuster 
Deals, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 682, 683 (2011). 
 102. See sources cited supra notes 96, 99.  
 103. Martin Kretschmer & Philip Hardwick, Authors’ Earnings from Copyright 
and Non-Copyright Sources: A Survey of 25,000 British and German Writers 
(Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management, Bournemouth Univ.), 
Dec. 2007, at 26. 
 104. See Richard Watt, Licensing and Royalty Contracts for Copyright, in 3 REV. 
ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 15 (2006). One way to look at royalty contracts 
is through the lens of a principal-agent relationship. See Ruth Towse, Copyright 
and Economic Incentives: An Application to Performers’ Rights in the Music 
Industry, 52 KYKLOS 369, 372-78 (1999); see also Peter DiCola, Money from Music: 
Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301 (on musician revenue generally and the distribution of 
royalty-based versus other income). 
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reallocates some of the risk of future success or failure back 
to the author. 
Because publishers know that authors and their 
statutory successors can terminate, the contract for 
successful works is necessarily limited to thirty-five years. 
Reducing the term from the entire duration of the copyright 
(life of the author plus seventy years)105 to a potential 
maximum of thirty-five years reduces the expected value of 
the copyright assignment that publishers are purchasing. In 
particular, publishers have to take into account that the 
works that turn out to be most profitable are the transfers 
that are most likely to be terminated. There is apparent 
imbalance in this contract situation: unlike the author, the 
publisher has no termination right, and therefore no 
opportunity to correct for a disproportionately high fee paid 
up front. The economically predicted reaction on the part of 
the publisher is to either reduce the price paid for the initial 
assignment,106 or enter into fewer exploitation contracts with 
authors.107  
Of course, even if they receive less payment upfront, 
introducing a termination right gives authors the possibility 
of receiving more money at a future point in time. However, 
this will only offset the initial loss in price for a small subset 
of highly successful authors. Kal Raustialia and Christopher 
Sprigman have likened this to a regressive tax, because the 
net effect is to transfer wealth from the unsuccessful to the 
successful artists.108 Furthermore, should publishers decide 
  
 105. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
 106. See Rub, supra note 15, at 95-98. 
 107. Although this is theoretically empirically measurable, since the law came 
into effect in 1976 and publishers may have changed their behavior after 
knowledge of the change, the intricacies of legal reality may prevent measurable 
strong results for the time period between introduction of the law and now. The 
exact mechanics of the rules were (and are) quite obscure and difficult to 
understand in detail, let alone interpret. Some publishers may have optimistically 
assumed that their business comprised works made for hire (e.g. sound 
recordings), or that right-holders would not be able to navigate (or be able to 
afford to navigate) this complex legal terrain. They also may have relied on 
coming up with workarounds, such as pre-termination agreements etc., the 
validity of which have yet to be decided by courts. 
 108. See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 89. 
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to reduce the number of contracts they invest in, fewer 
authors will receive any payment at all. Additionally, the 
work of those who lose out on initial contracts will not be 
distributed,109 resulting in less visibility for the respective 
artists and fewer total artistic works in the market. Finally, 
this additional payment for the lucky few will not occur until 
at least thirty-five years after the transfer or license of 
copyright. As mentioned above, authors are generally the 
party in need of a more or less immediate source of income, 
and are also far less able to diversify risk. The introduction 
of a termination right, in that it rewards only the most 
successful artists down the line, effectively reallocates some 
of the risk from the publisher back to the author. 110 
Given that the reasoning behind termination rights 
appears to be to help authors as the disadvantaged party,111 
this effect is unlikely what Congress originally envisioned.112 
Discussion of legislative intent aside, however, there could be 
economic justification for the law. In theory, it could be that 
the “regressive tax” outcome is desirable, for instance under 
the assumption that this high-risk lottery system will 
generate a “superstar effect,” inducing creators to strive for 
uncertain—but very high—payment.113 This would 
incentivize the creation of artistic works by many, even 
though only a few individuals are rewarded.114 While this is 
  
 109. At least not through the traditional channels that the publishers utilize in 
their function as gatekeepers. 
 110. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989). 
 111. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 140 (1976); see also supra Part I.A. 
 112. See supra Part I.A.; see also infra Part III.B. 
 113. See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845 
(1981); Diane L. Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine 
That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 41-42 (2011). For more on the “superstar 
effect” in creative industries, see CAVES, supra note 96, at 73-76. 
 114. Some have also argued that risk allocation could incentivize the authors 
who are most likely to be successful, while weeding out those with lesser 
potential. See Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Royalties for Artists Versus 
Royalties for Authors and Composers, 25 J. CULTURAL ECON. 259, 265 (2001). This 
argument is weaker to the extent that the success and failure of works is 
unpredictable. See CAVES, supra note 96, at 61; GRECO, supra note 96, at 5-6; 
Jones, supra note 68, at 140. 
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not the given reason for introducing author termination 
rights,115 these author incentives deserve examination in 
light of the general incentive theory behind U.S. copyright 
law.116 Part II.D explores the effect of author termination 
rights on creation motivation in more detail. 
First, however, the following Section addresses another 
concern regarding the introduction of author termination 
rights, namely that risk-reallocation back to the author may 
have a negative effect on publisher incentives. Any positive 
effects on author incentives ex ante would have to be weighed 
against the costs of an (ex post) effect on investment.117 
Economically, a royalty-rate contract (which is comparable 
here in terms of introducing profit participation between 
author and publisher) will necessarily lessen a publisher’s 
incentives to invest in the success of the work.118 Author 
termination rights not only decrease these incentives (similar 
to the case of royalty contracts)—they also raise further 
questions of rent-seeking behavior and hold-up situations. 
This is explored in the following. 
B. Hold-Up and Publisher Investment Incentives 
Apart from risk-reallocation, economic theory predicts 
that the author termination right may affect the publisher’s 
investment incentives. While copyrighted works may be the 
brainchild of the original creator, much of a work’s value to 
society can come from later investments in quality, 
  
 115. See supra Part I.A; infra Part III. 
 116. See sources cited supra note 93. 
 117. While this tradeoff cannot, of course, be conclusively measured with data, 
this Article indicates that a positive incentive effect is likely to be smaller than 
the costs of termination right introduction. See infra Parts II.2, II.4, III; see also 
DiCola, supra note 104, at 303 n.8 (explaining that some indication is valuable in 
the context of copyright policy, which currently lacks sufficient data to 
conclusively measure tradeoffs). 
 118. See CAVES, supra note 96, at 56-57 (“[T]he author’s royalty based on sales 
leaves the publisher with an underinducement to promote the [work] (the author, 
correspondingly, wants more promotion than would maximize author’s and 
publisher’s joint profits). The author’s advance [payment], though, strengthens 
greatly the publisher’s marginal incentive to promote—he gets roughly the full 
resulting gross profit— . . . which increases the efficiency of the contract.”). 
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marketability, and of course from access to the work through 
its subsequent distribution.119 The reason that copyrights are 
so commonly transferred or licensed to another party is often 
because the original author is not in the best position to make 
his or her work widely accessible to the public.120 In fact, the 
United States copyright system is based on the assumption 
that authors will enter into distribution contracts over their 
works,121 and recognizes publishers as both necessary and 
desirable. Intermediary incentives are therefore a relevant 
concern for copyright policy.122 Publishers function as 
intermediaries that disseminate works to the public and 
generate value by assessing markets, making necessary 
alterations to the work, and attempting to ensure the 
maximum profitable distribution thereof.123 Their entire 
business model is basically to purchase copyrights and make 
them remunerative by investing in marketing, finding the 
right distribution channels, and exploring new media and 
exploitation methods.124 In the process, they will often make 
contributions to the quality of the work itself (think, for 
example, of record labels that professionally record and 
master songs, book publishers that are involved in 
everything from editing to design, etc.). Given the role of 
publisher investments in the quality and distribution of 
creative works, as well as the development of new, improved 
exploitation methods, it seems important to consider the 
effects of author termination rights on these investment 
incentives.  
  
 119. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeabilty and Copyright Incentives, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1621-23 (2009). 
 120. See id.; see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for 
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 132-36 (2004). 
 121. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10-12 
(2010). 
 122. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole 
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] 
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labor of 
authors.”); see also DiCola, supra note 104, at 305-07. 
 123. See also DiCola, supra note 104, at 306-07. 
 124. See, e.g., Darling, supra note 98, at 526-27. 
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Allowing for a termination right, and thus a later 
renegotiation of contracts for (successful) works is 
comparable to a revenue-sharing contract ex ante. As 
mentioned above, this will reduce publishers’ investment 
incentives in any case, because they lose part of the value 
they will be investing in creating.125 Furthermore, however, 
both economic theory and intuition suggest a potential hold-
up problem when authors have the right to withdraw their 
grant and force publishers into contract renegotiation. 
Contract theory predicts that relationship-specific 
investments can give rise to undesirable opportunistic 
behavior.126 “Relationship-specific” refers to any investment 
that is unique to a contractual agreement and has no (or 
lower) value outside of the particular relationship between 
the parties.127 Once one of the parties has sunk costs in 
relationship-specific investments, these costs cannot be 
recouped when the relationship ends.128 
For copyright contracts, the investment problem arises 
because most of the above-mentioned investments that 
publishers make in improving, promoting, distributing, and 
sustaining the popularity and value of an artistic work are 
relationship-specific, meaning they are tied to a contract over 
a specific creation with a specific author. The publisher 
invests in the work because he or she is the holder and 
beneficiary of the copyright, and thus has an interest in 
increasing its value as much as possible. If the original 
  
 125. See CAVES, supra note 96, at 56-57; Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 
327; Rub, supra note 15, at 111. 
 126. See Darlene C. Chisholm, Asset Specificity and Long-Term Contracts: The 
Case of the Motion Pictures Industry, 19 E. ECON. J. 143, 144 (1993) [hereinafter 
Chisholm, Asset Specificity]. 
 127. Salanié defines relationship-specific investment as “an investment that 
increases the productivity of the relationship under study, has a lower value 
outside of this relationship, [or] is costly for the party that makes it.” BERNARD 
SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER 180 (MIT Press 1997) (1994); 
see also PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 461-62 
(2005); Vincent P. Crawford, Relationship-Specific Investment, 105 Q. J. ECON. 
561 (1990); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 
56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 
297, 322-24 (1978).  
 128. See Chisholm, Asset Specificity, supra note 126, at 144. 
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author (or the original author’s statutory successors), 
however, can threaten to terminate the contract and initiate 
renegotiation of terms, the publisher risks losing the value 
from his or her investment. Assuming that the original 
author (or statutory successor), has full knowledge of the 
commercial success of his or her work, this will allow them to 
drive the price up and capture the entire bargaining surplus. 
Because the investment costs are sunk and all future profit 
is dependent on continuing the contractual relationship with 
the author, the publisher can be “held up”—theoretically to 
the point at which nothing is gained from having made the 
investment in the first place.  
Because publishers can foresee this situation, it may 
dissuade them from making investments when they could or 
should from a social welfare perspective: economic theory 
predicts that such hold-up situations will cause socially 
undesirable underinvestment.129 Because the termination 
right can only be exercised during a specific point in time, it 
is also plausible that publishers will strategically manipulate 
their investments, such as by waiting to make large 
investments until the danger of being held up has passed. 
They may even attempt to sabotage the commercial success 
of a work during the time leading up to the window in which 
authors can consider to renegotiate.  
Returning to the story of the rights to “Superman,” it is 
intuitively clear that Time Warner and any other involved 
publishers with stakes in the exploitation rights to the 
character have halted any major investments in new 
projects, and will continue to do so, at the very least until the 
current legal battle has been resolved.130 In fact, the district 
court appears to have recognized this incentive problem in a 
follow-up decision, going so far as to essentially impose a duty 
on Time Warner to begin production of its movie sequel to the 
  
 129. See SALANIÉ, supra note 127, at 175-83. 
 130. See Michael Cieply, Ruling Gives Heirs a Share of Superman Copyright, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at C1; Ethan Smith, Warner Bros. Wins Court Fight 
Over Superman, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2013, http://www.online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324442304578233962555228832. 
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2006 success “Superman Returns.”131 It seems that the worry 
is indeed loss of value to the work due to underinvestment on 
the part of Time Warner.132 In absence of this judicial 
pressure, fans would be kept waiting or entirely deprived of 
the sequel, and will perhaps turn their interest (and money) 
towards substitutes. Another example of distorted 
investment incentives is the speculation that Time Warner, 
facing this mandate, chose the director for the Superman 
movie based on how fast the movie could be released rather 
than on artistic merit.133 
In terms of superheroes, the situation for many other 
popular characters is equally grim. Superman is far from 
being an exceptional case. For example, in the midst of a $4 
billion dollar acquisition, statutory successors of Marvel 
superhero creator Jack Kirby have served forty-five 
termination notices on figures from the “X-Men” and 
“Fantastic Four,” effective 2014.134 All of these characters now 
risk being tied up in litigation and withheld from the public 
for an unpredictable amount of time.135 Again, the historical 
success of these characters and their value today cannot be 
attributed to their authors alone, as the publishers have been 
responsible not only for character development, but also for 
all of the advertising and merchandising related to the 
work.136  
  
 131. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., No. CV 04-8400-SGL, 2009 WL 
2014164, at *21, 24 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 9, 2009). 
 132. See id. at *25-27. 
 133. See Rub, supra note 15, at 112 n.246 (citing Chris Schrader, Legal Wars 
Could Divide ‘Superman’ Franchise in Two, SCREENRANT, http://screenrant.com/
superman-movie-legal-battle-siegel-shuster-schrad-117539 (last updated March 
9, 2013)). 
 134. See Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); Michael Cieply & Brooks Barnes, Disney Faces Rights Issues Over Marvel, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at B1. 
 135. The case, Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, is ongoing, as it is facing appeal 
at the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See Murray, supra note 72, at 413-14; see 
also, e.g., Molinaro, supra note 73 (on Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 
280 (2d Cir. 2002), over the rights to Captain America). 
 136. For which most authors do not have the resources. See Murray, supra note 
72, at 436. 
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This situation is not limited to comic book characters, 
stretching across all creative industries subject to copyright 
transfer terminations through authors and their statutory 
successors. Rub, for example, highlights investment 
decisions in the recording industry and how record 
companies can strategically underinvest in a work during the 
time period before the termination rights can be exercised, or 
release works like best-hits records right before termination 
rather than at the time most beneficial to the author and the 
public.137 
Again, the transfer of copyright to a publisher has the 
purpose of facilitating investments and securing distribution 
of popular works. This corresponds to the interests of all 
involved parties, including authors and the general public. A 
termination right will cut into this investment incentive, 
because the author (or the author’s statutory successors) can 
step in at a later time and capture value that the publisher 
has invested in. This can influence to what extent or how a 
publisher invests in a work ex ante.  
There may also be hindrances to publisher investment 
post renegotiation of the contract. Even if publishers come to 
agreements with authors and statutory successors at the 
point of termination, ensuring that they can continue to 
exploit the copyrights, it is possible that the new agreement 
will be in the form of a revenue-sharing contract, for example 
involving royalty-rates.138 This is because the value of the 
work is more certain, making it potentially in the seller’s 
interest to share future revenue, rather than be bought out. 
Buy-outs are more attractive to the seller when risk is 
involved. As mentioned above, profit participation contracts 
are in neither party’s interest ex ante. Ex-ante, authors of a 
new work with uncertain success will prefer to burden the 
publisher with the risk of success or failure in return for an 
immediate paycheck.139 Ex post (i.e. at the time of 
  
 137. See Rub, supra note 15, at 112. 
 138. For discussions of royalty-rate contracts, see CAVES, supra note 96, at 56-
57; PASSMAN, supra note 99, at 74-82; Chisholm, Profit-Sharing, supra note 99; 
Menell & Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing, supra note 14, at 802. 
 139. For famous authors, or in instances where there is a higher probability of 
a work being successful on the market, profit participation contracts make more 
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termination), however, the value of the work is more certain. 
Publishers can no longer make the offer to bear the risk of 
success or failure in exchange for a smaller buy-out price. 
Again, publishers will prefer to buy out the copyright so that 
they can fully reap the gains of their own investments in the 
work’s success.140 In the case of termination rights, however, 
only owners of successful works will initiate renegotiation. 
Because they already know that the work is profitable, they 
no longer have the same valuation and risk-allocation 
problem that they had when agreeing to the initial 
arrangement. Now able to use the work’s value and the 
publisher’s sunk investments as bargaining leverage, 
authors and their statutory successors may demand profit 
participation in uses of the work. Where this occurs, it will 
lessen the return on ex post publisher investments, 
potentially setting sub-optimal incentives.141 
Rub additionally explores the potential for a tragedy of 
the anticommons in a system with author termination 
rights.142 The tragedy of the anticommons applies when a 
work is controlled by a multitude of right-owners, making it 
difficult to contract individually143 and, in the termination 
right context, raising the risk that assembled or collaborative 
works will be vetoed at some point in the future by one or 
more of the right-holders.144 While this is a legitimate concern 
in other legal systems,145 the structure of author termination 
rights in United States copyright law is more likely to 
  
sense (and are more common, see DE VANY, supra note 99, at 245-46; PASSMAN, 
supra note 99, at 68-82). In this instance, however, there is no need to introduce 
a termination right, since the author is more likely to have negotiated an 
appropriate remuneration up front. Furthermore, again, the deal is one-sided: in 
cases where works are not successful, the publisher has no option of getting 
money back. 
 140. Whether this is ex ante or ex post does not matter to the publisher. See 
CAVES, supra note 96, at 56-57. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Rub, supra note 15, at 118-26. 
 143. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 668, 670 (1998). 
 144. See Rub, supra note 15, at 77, 130. 
 145. See Darling, supra note 98, at 519-25. 
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mitigate this problem. The work made for hire doctrine is 
designed (and used in practice) to cover most of the works 
with a multitude of creators, a major example being films.146 
Nevertheless, the risk of right termination through one of the 
authors could deter investment in collective projects that 
bring previously individual copyrighted works together, for 
example using new media formats.147 This would exacerbate 
the hold-up problem illustrated above. 
In general, all of the above may hamper socially desirable 
investments in quality and distribution of creative content. 
This cost also affects the authors, who generally have a 
strong interest in seeing their works brought to success, 
marketed, and widely shared. While it may still be the case 
that there are also benefits to allowing authors a contract 
renegotiation opportunity (for example, allowing authors to 
renegotiate payment for successful works at a later point in 
time could theoretically foster creation incentives through 
the prospect of being able to reap high future earnings),148 
this must be weighed against the costs of underinvestment 
due to hold-up.149 Part II.D will explore the author incentive 
side of the cost-benefit analysis in more detail. First, 
however, the following Section addresses one of the main 
criticisms that hold-up theory may face in this context: 
reputational concerns in scenarios with repeated interaction. 
C. Repeated Games 
One argument frequently made against strong hold-up 
effects in real-world contract situations is that parties are 
often interested in (or dependent on) maintaining a good 
  
 146. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (covering works “specially ordered or commissioned for 
use as a contribution to a collective work” and explicitly mentioning films). The 
music and software industries are also contractually structured to avoid 
collaborative copyright ownership between a large multitude of parties, e.g. sound 
mixers are unlikely to have authorship claims in recordings. Rub acknowledges 
this. See Rub, supra note 15, at 116 n.264, 118-19 n.272. 
 147. See generally Darling, supra note 98. 
 148. But see infra Part II.D. 
 149. For further discussion, see infra Part III. 
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relationship with each other.150 In the case of authors and 
publishers, it initially seems plausible that the author would 
have other contractual relations with the same publishing 
partner, or could want to retain the possibility of future 
interactions. While a one-shot game induces authors to make 
demands that capture the bargaining surplus, introducing a 
repeated game situation mitigates the hold-up problem, 
because authors will be unlikely to extort sums from their 
publishers that would endanger their relationship. 
Publishers, on the other hand, may also be concerned 
about their reputation. While they are not in a position to 
hold up the author ex post, the general situation of the 
perceived disparity between initial copyright price and work 
value may entice favorable settlement gestures towards 
authors, particularly when public scrutiny is involved. As 
mentioned above,151 Time Warner offered the Superman 
creators lifetime pensions and healthcare benefits when the 
story of their financial condition got attention in the press.152 
Theoretically, while the desire to maintain a good 
relationship with a publisher might lessen any hold-up 
concerns, it would also mean that authors would not gain as 
much leverage through termination rights as legislative 
intent assumes. From this perspective, one would need to 
question what purpose granting author termination rights 
serves at all. It seems that, in either case, it could be 
preferable to resort to alternative ways of reaching these 
policy goals, whether they are utilitarian or distributive.153 
Even more realistically, however, it is questionable whether 
this repeated game scenario applies to most cases of author 
termination rights in practice at all. The shortest period of 
time that passes before an author is faced with the possibility 
of termination is thirty-five years. While some authors may 
still be dependent on continuing contractual relationships 
  
 150. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Eric Maskin, Renegotiation in Repeated Games, 
1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 327, 327-28 (1989) (on the idea of sustainable subgame-
perfect equilibria in repeated games). 
 151. See sources cited supra note 3. 
 152. See Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1112-13 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008). This was prior to having any legal obligation, e.g. through author 
termination right negotiations. 
 153. See infra Part III. 
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with a specific publisher at such a late point in time, many 
will not. For the most part, thirty-five years down the road, 
the situation is likely to be different. Furthermore, many 
rights will have changed hands and gone to the authors’ 
statutory successors. Unless the right successors are 
themselves authors and in a relationship with the same 
publisher, it seems unlikely that a repeated game scenario 
would occur, or lessen the statutory successors’ ability to 
extract financial gains from the publisher through author 
termination rights. 
One question left unaddressed by static hold-up theory is 
whether the renegotiation possibility could have a positive 
effect on ex ante author incentives, in other words on the 
investments made to create the work in the first place. This 
is explored in the following Part. 
D. Uncertainty, Intertemporal Choice, and Author 
Incentives 
One potential argument in favor of author termination 
rights resides within the utilitarian theory of U.S. copyright 
law.154 If authors can expect to reap high future earnings from 
the success of their works, they may have additional 
incentive to create, or to become authors in the first place. 
This would encourage the production of artistic work in 
general, furthering the “progress of art,” which is the 
constitutionally defined aim of the U.S. copyright system.155  
As mentioned above,156 introducing author termination 
rights creates a lottery-like effect, reducing prices for initial 
copyright assignments, but giving authors a high-risk, high-
gain chance at earning profits much later on. This lottery, 
also called a “superstar effect,” could entice more artistic 
creation ex ante through the prospect of potentially large 
  
 154. See sources cited supra note 93. For more discussion on the aims of the 
copyright system, see infra Part III. 
 155. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”); see also sources cited supra 
note 93 and discussion infra Part III. 
 156. See supra Part II.A. 
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reward.157 The “superstar effect” in creative industries has 
faced some criticism with regard to efficiency.158 Rather than 
rehash the discussion over whether or not high-risk, high-
reward systems function as efficient incentive mechanisms 
in creative markets in general,159 this Section highlights some 
effects that apply specifically to the context of author 
termination rights and make the former discussion largely 
irrelevant. If the “superstar effect” is to be generally 
functional as an author incentive mechanism, this relies on 
authors basing their decision-making on the future chance of 
high reward. Not only must authors factor in the future 
remuneration possibility at the point in time during which 
they are deciding whether to invest in creating the work, but 
this prospect must outweigh whatever losses they suffer 
through a termination right introduction.160  
The positive effect on creation incentives operates under 
the assumptions that [1] authors prefer the uncertain 
probability of high payment to the more certain probability 
of lower payment; [2] the uncertain payment possibility has 
sufficient value to the author despite occurring in the far 
future. These assumptions are examined in the following. 
1. Uncertainty and Risk Aversion. With regard to work 
creation incentives, the author’s situation involves a decision 
based on uncertain information. Copyright is granted 
(automatically) once the work has been fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.161 Its market success, however, 
  
 157. See Rosen, supra note 113, at 845; see also Zimmerman, supra note 113, at 
41-42. 
 158. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL 
SOCIETY: HOW MORE AND MORE AMERICANS COMPETE FOR EVER FEWER AND BIGGER 
PRIZES, ENCOURAGING ECONOMIC WASTE, INCOME INEQUALITY, AND AN 
IMPOVERISHED CULTURAL LIFE 110 (1995); DiCola, supra note 104, at 307. 
 159. For more on this question, see FRANK & COOK, supra note 158, at 110; see 
generally DiCola, supra note 104 (finding that musicians are motivated by 
copyright through the guarantee of significant future rewards if, in accordance 
with the superstar model, they improbably gain large popularity). 
 160. See supra Part II.A. 
 161. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2011). 
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remains highly speculative.162 In absence of author 
termination rights, the author has the near-future possibility 
of monetizing his or her copyright by selling it to a publisher, 
and no far-future possibility to correct for undervaluing the 
work in the initial assignment. With the introduction of 
author termination rights, the author gains a far-future 
possibility of correction at the price of a lower compensation 
upfront.163 Compared to the near-future compensation, 
however, this far-future correction opportunity is highly 
uncertain. 
Standard economic theory applies the concept of expected 
utility to decision-making under uncertain conditions. Actors 
will choose among different prospects, which are essentially 
collections of all of the possible outcomes of an action 
multiplied by their respective probabilities of occurring.164 
Expected utility theory states that the value of a “prospect” 
is the expected value of all of its outcomes. 
To assess the expected value of the uncertain payment 
coming from exercising a termination right, the author will 
operate with the weighted average of potential values times 
the probabilities that they will occur. While this sounds 
highly complex and mathematical, it may not be so 
unrealistic in effect: with regard to the question of complete 
information, economic theory recognizes that real-world 
actors’ cognitive abilities are limited.165 Predictive 
uncertainty, i.e. the inability to recognize or take into account 
all possible outcomes deriving from an action, is part of the 
  
 162. See CAVES, supra note 96, at 2-3, 61; GRECO, supra note 96, at 5-6; Jones, 
Market Research, supra note 95, at 555-56.  
 163. See supra Part II.A. 
 164. See Philippe Mongin, Expected Utility Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 171, 171-79 (John B. Davis et al. eds., 1998).  
 165. See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, 
Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 600 (2000) (“There is close to 
unanimity . . . on the idea of limited cognitive competence—often referred to as 
bounded rationality.”). But see infra Part II.E for more on a different definition of 
“bounded rationality” as understood by behavioral economics. 
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rational actor model.166 Most real-world situations that 
require decision-making involve some degree of uncertainty, 
meaning the actors do not have complete information to base 
their decisions on. Whenever the cost of acquiring the 
necessary information is too high,167 actors will use their 
limited information to make choices.168 Choices are then 
based on probabilities and anticipated likelihoods, and reflect 
this limitation of uncertainty. Even if authors have very 
limited information about their success chances, they will 
likely operate with some sort of probability value.  
According to the substitution axiom, if all prospects have 
the same expected values, an actor will be indifferent in 
choosing between them.169 Within this framework, if the 
(expected) value of the later payment is generally higher than 
the price authors expect to get for their work upfront pre-
introduction, then the introduction of author termination 
rights would incentivize more creation. If it is not, for 
example, if the choice is between $120 or a 1% chance of 
getting $11,000, termination rights will not incentivize more 
creation. There are, however, further factors to consider. In 
particular, risk-averse actors will value the choices 
differently. 
An actor is risk averse if he or she prefers a certain 
prospect to a risky prospect, despite them having the same 
expected value. Risk aversion is generally assumed for 
expected utility models, which is explained by the concept of 
decreasing marginal utility. This holds that more of 
something within a certain time frame will diminish the 
  
 166. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999); Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen 
Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999). 
 167. For instance because it is difficult to predict future chances. See RICHARD 
R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 
88 (1982).  
 168. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: MERGERS, 
CONTRACTING, AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 74-78 (1987); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, 
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 21–26 (1975).  
 169. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 266 (1979). 
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utility of additional units.170 In other words, money earned 
when times are tough will have more value than the same 
amount of money earned when times are good and general 
income is high.171 
Applied to termination rights, a risk-averse author will 
value the certain payment more than the uncertain payment, 
even if the two expected values are equal. In general, 
individuals are assumed to be risk-averse, especially with 
regard to their basic income.172 Furthermore, early in their 
careers, authors may be particularly likely to be risk averse 
regarding their work and to prefer the immediate certain 
payment.173 From this perspective, the prospects of a high-
risk lottery may not necessarily have a positive effect on 
creation incentives. Authors may not value uncertain future 
payment highly enough to outweigh the loss they suffer in 
their more immediate payment. This effect, despite 
theoretical indication, cannot be measured conclusively.174 
But even if a positive value remains within this framework, 
there are additional factors to consider. One such factor is the 
question of intertemporal decision-making, since the 
prospect of financial reward occurs so far in the future. This 
is explored in the following. 
2. Discounting. Another issue is what value the potential 
future payment has for the author at the time of creation, 
especially given that it is in exchange for a present cost. The 
intuitively plausible notion that most authors might prefer 
  
 170. See Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices 
Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 279-80 (1948). 
 171. See PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, ECONOMICS 545-49 (2009). 
 172. See Friedmand & Savage, supra note 170, at 279-80; see also KRUGMAN & 
WELLS, supra note 171, at 545-49. 
 173. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 114, at 262; see also Rub, supra note 
15, at 99. 
 174. Some have also argued that high-risk, high-reward intellectual property 
systems, similar to state-run lottery systems, could be based on individuals 
recognizing the respective size of gains versus losses, but systematically 
overestimating their personal chances of success. See Dennis D. Crouch, The 
Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 141 (2008). But see infra Part II.D.2 (discussing intertemporal 
effects). 
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immediate rather than later payment175 has a solid basis in 
economic theory. One important aspect of far-future payment 
that could influence decision-making preferences (and in the 
author termination right context therefore creation 
incentives) is discounting. 
Discounting pertains to the phenomenon of placing 
higher value on something received immediately than one 
does on the same thing received at a later point in time. While 
part of this is a simple reflection of the fact that goods or 
capital regularly lose value in the future because the general 
supply thereof increases, it is also recognized that people 
exhibit a strong personal preference for immediate 
payment.176 The economic concept of discounting is based on 
early recognition of psychological factors involved in 
intertemporal decision-making.177 In the 1930s, economists 
began to use a single parameter for these factors, called the 
discount rate.178 
Discounting is relevant in the context of author 
termination rights, because if the initial payment for the 
author’s copyright is reduced through the introduction of a 
termination possibility, a high discount rate could actually 
reduce author investment incentives rather than raise 
them.179 How much more an individual values the same thing 
now versus later is reflected in his or her personal time 
preferences. The higher the time preference rate, the more 
highly the individual will discount future values. While the 
  
 175. See Rub, supra note 15, at 86-87. 
 176. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1995) (rejecting 
the critical view that this assumption is but a technical convenience); ARTHUR C. 
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 24-25 (1920). 
 177. See e.g., EUGEN BÖHM-BAWERK, CAPITAL AND INTEREST (1889); JOHN RAE, 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CAPITAL (1834). 
 178. The discounted utility model was introduced by Paul A. Samuelson. See 
Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on Measurement of Utility, 4 REV. ECON. STUD. 155 
(1937); see also Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A 
Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351 (2002). 
 179. Similar to, and in fact in addition to, the effect of risk aversion and 
uncertainty discussed above. See supra Part II.D.1. 
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extent of this is partly subjective, individuals are assumed to 
systematically discount future value.180 
Additionally, there is evidence that uncertain payoffs 
will further influence the extent of discounting. People tend 
to have much higher discount rates when rewards are 
certain.181 Given that, in the termination right context, the 
first reward is far more certain than the second uncertain 
payout, it is plausible that authors may discount the future 
value even more highly. 
In summary, because the author may not value far-
future gains as much as immediate ones, this could influence 
his or her decision to create the work. Given that there is no 
exact knowledge of the reward values in relation to each 
other, nor the discount rates of individual authors,182 it is not 
possible to determine that the effect of termination rights on 
  
 180. Time preferences are recognized to be heterogeneous. See infra note 188. 
For evidence of heterogeneous time preference rates leading to distribution 
effects, see, for example, Lutz Hendricks, How Important is Discount Rate 
Heterogeneity for Wealth Inequality?, 31 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 3042 
(2007). 
 181. See, for example, a seminal study by Gideon Keren & Peter Roelofsma, 
Immediacy and Certainty in Intertemporal Choice, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 287 (1995). 
 182. In this context, another potentially relevant theory of interest is the 
behavioral economic concept of time inconsistency. In particular, empirical 
studies have shown that—contrary to traditional assumption—individuals’ 
discount rates do not necessarily remain constant for all future time periods, but 
instead appear to grow smaller over time. See Richard Thaler, Some Empirical 
Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETT. 201, 201-07 (1981); see also 
HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 556-57 
(7th ed. 2006). This observation, called hyperbolic discounting, see Ariel 
Rubenstein, “Economics and Psychology”? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting, 44 
INT. ECON. REV. 1207 (2003), would weaken the result in so far that authors would 
not discount as much as initially assumed, since the expected profit is in the far, 
rather than immediate, future. However, while hyperbolic discounting has been 
manifestly demonstrated in cases with given (certain) time-frames and payoffs, 
the results of studies introducing uncertainty have been highly ambiguous. See 
Martin Ahlbrecht & Martin Weber, The Resolution of Uncertainty: An 
Experimental Study, 152 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 593 (1996) (finding that 
introducing uncertainty dramatically affects estimated discount rates); Keren & 
Roelofsma, supra note 181, at 287-97 (finding the same). Because the question of 
future value of copyrighted works involves such considerable uncertainty, the 
concept of hyperbolic discounting cannot (yet) serve as a solid theoretical basis to 
evaluate the problem at hand. 
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author incentives is necessarily a negative one. What theory 
indicates, however, is that the positive effect may be smaller 
than assumed. Again, even if authors are positively 
motivated to create more work, this effect must be evaluated 
within a tradeoff. Any positive incentives must be weighed 
against the costs explored above, in particular the effects on 
publisher incentives and costs to the system as a whole.183 
It may be that authors anticipate (at least part of) the 
possibility of far-future gains with the introduction of author 
termination rights. Even so, there are a few additional 
considerations as to their relevancy for work creation. These 
are highlighted in the following. 
3. Further Considerations. There are two further factors 
that could play a role in authors’ intertemporal decision-
making process, thereby impacting their creation incentives. 
These have to do with the length of the time period before 
termination rights can be exercised, and with the statutory 
succession of the rights. 
First of all, because thirty-five years must elapse before 
the termination right can take effect, some authors will no 
longer be alive at this point. While copyright incentives may 
include the author’s desire to accumulate wealth for his or 
her family and/or successors, the prospect of payment post 
mortem may have a different value to some compared to 
wealth they can enjoy while they are alive.184 
The law specifies that author termination rights pass on 
to the right successors when the author is deceased.185 
Interestingly, the law assigns this interest to the statutorily 
designated successors, rather than permitting the author to 
determine whom he or she wishes to pass the right to. 
Ownership of termination rights follows the rules laid out in 
the Copyright Act, and therefore belongs first and foremost 
to the author’s widow or widower, then to his or her children, 
  
 183. Although neither side of the tradeoff can be exactly measured due to lack 
of numbers, we can try to get an idea of their respective weights in relation to 
each other. 
 184. See, e.g., RAE, supra note 177 (on the uncertainty of human life as a factor 
that reduces the motivation to defer gratification). 
 185. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2). 
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and finally to the grandchildren.186 Only if none of these 
statutorily designated successors are alive can the ownership 
be transferred according to the will of the author, or be owned 
by the author’s executor, administrator, personal 
representative, or trustee.187 This succession happens 
regardless and independent of what the author actually 
wants.188  
Therefore, when talking about creation incentives, it can 
be useful to remember that the author will in many cases not 
personally and directly profit from this far-future possibility 
of renegotiation. Additionally, the transfer of this option to 
the parties that will later profit may not even be in the 
author’s interest. 
Incentivizing the creation of a work is only the first step. 
As seen above, another incentive purpose is to facilitate the 
subsequent distribution of the work.189 This relates to the 
contracting situation between author and publisher. While 
far-future gains may not impact the author’s incentive to 
create, they could influence the slightly later transaction 
between the parties. In the contracting situation, both the 
authors’ decisions and motivations as well as the publishers’ 
decisions and motivations are relevant. For example, in the 
transaction, publishers could equally discount future gains or 
losses when deciding whether to purchase a copyright.190 The 
  
 186. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2)(A)-(C), 304(c)(2)(A)-(C). 
 187. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2)(D), 304(c)(2)(D). Although if the author serves notice 
of termination before his or her death, the termination right will have vested in 
the author and become part of the estate. In this case, the author can determine 
through will to whom the right passes. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(2), 304(c)(6)(B), 
304(d)(1). 
 188. Some have criticized this. See Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law From 
the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109, 167-82 (2006). Desai criticizes 
the transfer of copyrights to heirs generally, pointing out undesirable rent-
seeking behavior. See Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. 
L. REV. 219 (2011). 
 189. See Balganesh, supra note 119, at 1621; see also supra Part II.B. 
 190. To the extent that publishers discount the future, this influences to what 
extent the prices for initial copyright assignments drop when author termination 
rights are introduced. For heavy discount rates, the price difference pre- and post-
termination right introduction will be smaller. However, much of the literature 
assumes time preferences to be heterogeneous. See Robert B. Barsky et al., 
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parties’ behavior in the contracting situation influences the 
price of the copyright assignment and the distribution of the 
work, both ex ante and ex post termination rights. 
While so far this Article has indicated that the economic 
costs of risk-shifting and hold-up outweigh the potential 
benefits of incentivizing creation through author termination 
rights,191 the next Section looks at some additional effects 
that are worth considering in the general tradeoff. There are 
some behavioral economic concepts that could potentially 
play a role in the context of author termination right 
contracts ex ante and ex post, in particular fairness 
preferences and opt-in effects.  
E. Behavioral Economics 
So far, the above-predicted economic outcomes operate 
under the classic assumption of individuals as rational 
actors. While this simplification of reality is useful and 
sometimes necessary, some research over the last few 
decades has shown that people may be subject to systematic 
biases that can—and should—be considered in models of 
  
Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach 
in the Health and Retirement Study, 112 Q. J. ECON. 537 (1997); Kerwin Kofi 
Charles & Erik Hurst, The Correlation of Wealth across Generations, 111 J. POLIT. 
ECON. 1155 (2003); Erik Hurst, Ming Ching Luoh & Frank P. Stafford, The Wealth 
Dynamics of American Families: 1984-1994, 29 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY 267 (1998); Per Krusell & Anthony A. Smith, Jr., Income and Wealth 
Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy, 106 J. POL. ECON. 867 (1998); Emily C. 
Lawrance, Poverty and the Rate of Time Preference: Evidence From Panel Data, 
99 J. POL. ECON. 54 (1991); Andrew A. Samwick, Discount Rate Heterogeneity and 
Social Security Reform, 57 J. DEV. ECON. 117 (1998). The economic assumption 
that firms have lower discount rates than individuals is based on two factors. 
First, firms are likely less subject to the “impatience” of individuals, who may 
discount because they underestimate future needs due to shortsightedness or 
carelessness. See BÖHM-BAWERK, supra note 177, at 269; ARTHUR C. PIGOU, 1 THE 
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 24-25 (2005) (speaking of a cognitive illusion); see also 
Frederick et al., supra note 178, at 354. Second, discounting is attributed to an 
internal risk premium that arises because the future enjoyment of capital is 
contingent on uncertain circumstances that are more prevalent in individuals 
(such as, for example, the probability of not dying beforehand). See GEORGE 
REISMAN, CAPITALISM: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 55-56 (1998). 
 191. Which this Part has indicated may be small to non-existent. 
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economic behavior.192 These extensions to classic models are 
still far from perfectly mirroring the real world, but 
incorporating established human biases that more accurately 
reflect the behavior of individuals can change relevant 
outcomes and improve the power of classic economic theory 
as a predictive tool. Law and economics look at the 
implications of legal rules through an economic approach to 
human behavior. According to Gary Becker, this behavior 
assumes that actors “[1] maximize their utility [2] from a 
stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal 
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of 
markets.”193 However, so long as people are deviating from 
the rational actor model in a systematic way, considering 
behavioral biases is consistent with economic modeling.194  
One bias that may more accurately reflect the choices 
humans make in some situations is the concept of bounded 
rationality.195 Bounded rationality, in this context, means 
that actors deviate from Becker’s approach196 and display 
non-optimizing behavior, but in a systematic, measurable 
way.197 Behavioral economic studies have demonstrated a few 
effects that go beyond the classic recognition of limited 
cognitive capabilities,198 some of which may be relevant in the 
context of author termination rights. The following Parts 
  
 192. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic 
System, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND 
PSYCHOLOGY 201, 202 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986); Christine 
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 
1478 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). 
 193. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). 
 194. See Arrow, supra note 192, at 202 (“[T]here is no general principle that 
prevents the creation of an economic theory based on other hypotheses than that 
of rationality. . . . [A]ny coherent theory of reactions to the stimuli appropriate in 
an economic contex . . . could in principle lead to a theory of the economy.”); see 
also COLIN F. CAMERER, GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN, & MATTHEW RABIN, ADVANCES IN 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3 (2011); Jolls et al., supra note 192, at 1478. 
 195. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. 
ECON. 99 (1955). 
 196. See BECKER, supra note 193, at 14. 
 197. Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION AND 
ORGANIZATION 161, 163-64 (C.B. McGuire & Roy Radner eds., 1971). 
 198. Unlike discussed above in Part II.D on uncertainty. 
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explore the behavioral economic concepts of fairness 
preferences and opt-in effects, and their potential 
implications for author termination rights. Fairness 
preferences may play a role for authors’ ex ante creation 
incentives, as well as the terms and desirability of the initial 
assignment of copyright to a publisher. Opt-in effects could 
potentially lessen the ex post costs of hold-up and the 
negative effect on publisher investment incentives. 
1. Fairness Preferences. As mentioned above, the prices 
of copyright assignments and the subsequent distribution of 
works depend on how the parties contract with each other. A 
potential effect of interest in this context is that of the 
parties’ fairness preferences, because it may influence their 
contracting behavior. Fairness preferences may also play a 
role for creation incentives, especially if termination rights 
make the creator environment a more attractive one to be in 
from a fairness preference perspective. 
Fairness preferences can be described as follows: the 
standard economic model assumes that all actions are 
motivated by self-interest.199 Behavioral economic studies 
have shown, however, that people sometimes do not behave 
in accordance with the classic rational actor model when 
values are attached to their perception of “fairness.”200 There 
is evidence that people will systematically display behavior 
some would describe as “altruistic,” or “spiteful,” even when 
these actions involve a cost to themselves.201 While such 
behavior can theoretically also be categorized as “self-
interested” because it fits into a more general model of utility, 
  
 199. See George J. Stigler, Economics or Ethics?, in The TANNER LECTURES ON 
HUMAN VALUES 190 (Sterling McMurin ed., 1981) (“[W]here self-interest and 
ethical values with wide verbal allegiance are in conflict[,] [m]uch of the time[,] 
most of the time in fact, self-interest theory . . . will win.”). 
 200. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics 
of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP., Aug. 2000, at 159; Elizabeth Hoffman et al., 
Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and 
Evolutionary Psychology, 36 ECON. INQ. 335 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., 
Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. 285 (1986); James Konow, 
Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions, 90 
AM. ECON. REV. 1072 (2000). 
 201. See NICK WILKINSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 328 
(2008). 
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behavioral economics expands on the rational actor model to 
explicitly include costly actions that benefit others without 
material gain for oneself,202 and costly actions that impose a 
cost on others with no corresponding material gain. 
While fairness preferences are intuitively evident in real-
world observations that do not fully align with the standard 
rational actor model,203 their existence and consistency are 
also based on a body of empirical evidence. Behavioral 
economic studies have explored fairness preferences in 
ultimatum bargaining games,204 dictator games,205 trust 
games,206 and public goods games,207 finding that people 
systematically deviate from what the rational actor model 
predicts. Behavioral economists have since developed models 
that incorporate fairness preferences. For example, inequity 
aversion models.208 People display inequity aversion when 
  
 202. But rather a psychological benefit from which the actor derives utility. 
 203. For example, tipping in the service industry, voter participation, lost-and-
found offices, punishing people who free ride on others’ investments—even when 
it is costly to do so—, and so on. 
 204. Werner Güth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 380 (1982); Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On 
Expectations and Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games, 25 INT. J. GAME THEORY 
289, 292, 297 (1996) [hereinafter Hoffman, On Expectations]; John List & Todd 
Cherry, Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental 
Design that Generates Low Offers, 3 J. EXP. ECON., June 2000, at 11. 
 205. See Robert Forsythe et al., Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 347 (1994); Hoffman et al., On Expectations, supra note 
204. 
 206. Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. 
BEHAV. 122, 131-38 (1995). 
 207. John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in 
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 
1995); see also David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A 
Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 58 
(1995). 
 208. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, 
Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. ECON. 817 (1999); see also Gary E. Bolton 
& Axel Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. 166 (2000). Further models deal more with reciprocity. See Armin 
Falk & Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity, 54 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 293 
(2006); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 
83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993). 
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they care about the size of their payoffs in relation to other 
people’s payoffs.209 
Fairness preferences and inequity aversion could play a 
role in the context of author termination rights. For example, 
an experimental study by Christoph Engel and Michael 
Kurshilgen indicates that allowing for ex-post adjustment of 
copyright exploitation contracts could have positive effects 
because people tend to deviate from the rational actor model 
in this context.210 In the study, participants bargain over the 
sale of a commodity, assuming that its future value is highly 
uncertain. In one version, there is no possibility to correct the 
bargained-for price after the deal is struck.211 In the other 
version, the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate the 
payment, and if that fails, a third party is asked to determine 
an “appropriate purchase price.”212 Engel and Kurschilgen 
look at the changes in market prices, amount of agreements, 
and the differences in perceived fairness of the deals.213 They 
find that with the introduction of a renegotiation possibility, 
lower prices are indeed paid for authors’ copyrights ex ante.214 
The experiment also finds, however, that more deals are 
struck, which benefits both parties and affects an 
improvement in social welfare because more trade takes 
place.215 The reason for this is assumed to be the parties’ 
  
 209. See Bolton & Ockenfela, supra note 208; Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 208. 
 210. Engel & Kurschilgen, supra note 101, at 682, 699-700. 
 211. Id. at 684-86. 
 212. Id. at 687-89. The experiment is based on the “Bestseller Paragraph” in 
German copyright law, which gives authors the right to a reasonable cut of profits 
in right transfers to works that turn out to be “bestsellers,” i.e. if the profits and 
advantages from the use of the work are clearly disproportionate to what the 
author originally was paid. See Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte 
Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz) (Copyright Act), Sept. 9, 1965, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL.] I, at 1273, § 32(a) (Ger.) (“[D]ie vereinbarte 
Gegenleistung . . . in einem auffälligen Missverhältnis zu den Erträgen und 
Vorteilen aus der Nutzung des Werkes steht”). While this law is slightly different 
from United States author termination rights, the experiment itself (as seen 
above) is simplified enough for the setting to be comparable and equally 
applicable. 
 213. Engel & Kurschilgen, supra note 101, at 682. 
 214. As suggested above, supra Part II.A. 
 215. Engel & Kurschilgen, supra note 101, at 693-99. 
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fairness preferences. Offers to purchase are rejected ex ante 
without the future possibility to correct for value. When 
questioned, the participants reported less perceived ex post 
unfairness with the adjustment possibility.216 This indicates 
that fairness preferences might create barriers to trade that 
can be mitigated by introducing the possibility of ex post 
contract adjustment.  
The overall implication of these findings is that the 
introduction of author termination rights may overcome 
existing barriers to trade resulting from the parties’ fairness 
preferences, thus leading to more agreements. Even though 
the initial prices that copyrights trade for are lower, the 
finding that more deals are struck deviates from the outcome 
predicted by standard economic theory. The results of the 
experiment indicate that sellers (authors) and buyers 
(publishers) do indeed have and act on fairness preferences.  
The implications of fairness preferences would affect the 
cost-benefit tradeoff of author termination rights. As 
discussed above, standard economic theory assumes the 
introduction of a termination right to have negative ex ante 
economic implications.217 The existence of fairness 
preferences could lessen the negative impact and be worth 
considering in the general tradeoff.  
2. Opt-In Effects. Behavioral effects could also come into 
play at the point in time when the termination rights are 
exercisable. The termination right allows the author to 
threaten the publisher with copyright withdrawal, thereby 
initiating a renegotiation over the terms of the grant. 
Assuming rational actors, this threat will be made whenever 
the value of the granted rights is—or has become—larger 
than what was agreed to in the original contract. The parties 
will then always renegotiate and come to new terms 
reflecting the change in value. However, assuming boundedly 
rational actors may lead to a different outcome. One possible 
bias could be opt-in effects. Opt-in effects refer to the 
stickiness of default rules. Studies have shown that systems 
requiring individuals to take a specific, even non-costly, 
  
 216. Although interestingly their results show this for the buyers, i.e. the 
publishers, and not necessarily for the sellers, i.e. the authors. See id. at 684. 
 217. For example, lower initial prices, a shift of risk from the publisher to the 
author, and ambiguous effects on creation incentives. 
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action in order to achieve an outcome that corresponds to 
their preferences can lead to a far lower amount of 
individuals opting for this outcome than would in absence of 
the need to take action.  
This goes further than simply being a matter of 
transaction costs.218 For example, Johnson and Goldstein look 
at peoples’ choices as to whether or not to donate their 
organs.219 They compare countries with an opt-out default, 
meaning that in these countries people’s consent to donating 
their organs is presumed unless they register otherwise, to 
countries with an opt-in default, meaning that people must 
explicitly consent to donating their organs. Standard 
economic theory would predict that, in this situation, peoples’ 
willingness to donate or not donate will correspond to their 
(pre-held) preference, since it is not overly costly to express. 
In fact, however, countries with an opt-out default are shown 
to have a far higher donation rate, even when controlled for 
social and other factors.220 Furthermore, countries with low 
donation rates were found to have similarly high approval 
rates of organ donation in the population when surveyed for 
sentiment, despite the fact that the numbers of people who 
had actually signed a donor card were far lower.221 
Similarly, studies have revealed that changing defaults 
for employee 401(k) (or other) saving plans from opt-in to opt-
out considerably increases enrollment.222 Here too, even 
though only few employees had previously chosen the 
  
 218. For example, the costs of the action outweighing the potential gains from 
taking it. 
 219. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI. 
1338, 1338-39 (2003). 
 220. Id. at 1338. 
 221. Id. (citing THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC’S ATTITUDE 
TOWARD ORGAN DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION 14-15 (1993) (discussing a 1993 
poll that shows that while 85% of Americans approve of organ donation, only 28% 
had opted to do so)). 
 222. James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, 
Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance, in 16 TAX POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 67 (James M. Poterba ed., 2002); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis Shea, 
The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 
116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001). 
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contribution rate that later became the default, most chose to 
stay with the default once it was in place.223 
There are various hypotheses as to why these default 
rules are sticky. If preferences are constructed,224 in other 
words, not already formulated like standard economic theory 
assumes, actors may decide based on thinking that the 
default is a recommendation from the entity that set it,225 or 
they may be avoiding making an active decision because it 
requires psychological (or other) effort,226 or they may be 
reluctant to change the status quo due to loss aversion.227 
Regardless of whether due to framing effects, starting points, 
or other factors, most opt-in and opt-out regimes tend to 
display dramatic differences.228 
Although some of the above hypotheses might not 
necessarily apply in the context of termination rights, the 
fact that action is required on the part of authors to make use 
of their rights could nevertheless be an issue. If actors are 
indeed generally hindered by more than just transaction 
costs in taking specific actions that would otherwise be in 
their interest, then authors may make less use of termination 
rights than intended. Furthermore, the execution of 
termination rights is considerably complicated.229 According 
to the observations of the district court in Siegel v. Warner 
Bros. Entertainment, “[t]he termination provisions contained 
  
 223. Madrian & Shea, supra note 222, at 1150. 
 224. John W. Payne et al., Behavioral Decision Research: A Constructive 
Processing Perspective, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 87 (1992); Paul Slovic, The 
Construction of Preference, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 489-502 (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
 225. See, e.g., Madrian & Shea, supra note 222, at 1150. 
 226. See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 219, at 1338. 
 227. For more on loss aversion, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss 
Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 
(1991). 
 228. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not 
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159-60 (2003). 
 229. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 304 (c), 203(b); 37 C.F.R. § 210.10 (2009) (further 
regulations issued by the Copyright Office); see also Loren, Renegotiating, supra 
note 14, at 1335; William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 
AM. J. COMP. L. 383, 447 (2000) [hereinafter Patry, Choice of Law]. 
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in the Copyright Act of 1976 have aptly been characterized 
as formalistic and complex, such that authors, or their heirs, 
successfully terminating the grant to the copyright in their 
original work of authorship is a feat accomplished ‘against all 
odds.’”230 The court further notes: “[I]t is difficult to overstate 
the intricacies of these provisions, the result of which is that 
they are barely used, no doubt the result desired by lobbyists 
for assignees.”231 It is further the author’s responsibility to 
keep track of the exact dates and initiate the termination. 
The publisher has no notification or information duties. In 
practice, this is likely to result in a certain percentage of 
authors—or their statutory successors—forgetting, not being 
aware of, not going through the trouble for, or otherwise 
relinquishing their termination possibilities.  
This effect would mitigate at least part of the negative 
effects described above. It can be noted, however, that 
instating a complicated legal rule to benefit authors who 
neglect to make use of it for behavioral reasons, would be 
both strange and unnecessary. It would be more efficient in 
the interest of policy makers and all involved parties to find 
a better-suited solution. 
The next and final Part of this Article will recap the 
discussed costs and benefits and explore their relevance for 
copyright policy. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
This Article has looked at the economics surrounding the 
introduction of author termination rights. This Part will 
explore the implications of the discussed effects. The first 
Section will do so within the standard incentive theory 
framework.232 The second Section will look at author 
  
 230. Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101-02 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008) (citing PATRY, COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, § 7:52). 
 231. Siegel, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (quoting Patry, Choice of Law, supra note 
229, at 447); see also Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 621 
(2d Cir. 1982) (commenting that the steps necessary to make a termination 
effective oftentimes create “difficult, technical questions”).  
 232. This is not the only conceivable framework: literature on the theories and 
philosophies of intellectual property often brings up the concept of copyright as a 
moral right inherent to the author. See Barbara Friedman, From Deontology to 
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termination rights from the perspective of the officially given 
policy goals. The reasoning behind author termination rights 
is largely distributive and has been central to the discourse 
surrounding the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976. It should 
therefore not go unaddressed. 
A. Utilitarian Goals 
Given the utilitarian function of copyright law in aiming 
to incentivize the creation of artistic works,233 the theory 
behind author termination rights could be that the 
opportunity to renegotiate rights later on and additionally 
profit from the success of the work leads to more creation ex 
ante. The anticipation of future profits will entice more 
authors to create in the first place, thus furthering the 
progress of the arts, as is the proclaimed goal of the system.234 
While this is not the given rationale for introducing 
termination rights,235 it makes sense to first evaluate them 
within this framework. 
Because authors are given a chance to reap some of the 
benefits later on if what they create is successful, this could 
motivate their work. From the economic perspective of our 
policy in practice thus far, which is based on a very simple 
concept, this adds up. Copyright theory, as it is commonly 
  
Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
157 (1994); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 
287, 350-51 (1988). This theory is the historical basis for copyright law in some 
countries. See, e.g., Darling, supra note 98, at 497-505; Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale 
of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 
TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the 
Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright 
Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994). However, moral rights theory has 
never been given a strong stance in United States copyright policy, where 
copyright is regarded (and generally treated) as an incentive mechanism. Authors 
are granted exclusionary rights in order “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . [the] 
Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. As such, this Article has chosen this framework 
for its central analysis. See supra Part II. 
 233. See sources cited supra note 93. 
 234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 235. See supra Part I; see also infra Part III.B. 
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understood in practice, assumes linearity of author 
incentives.236 The more future gains an author is promised, 
the more artistic creation this will incentivize.  
However, it can be questioned as to what happens to 
authors’ incentives when a highly uncertain, far-future 
remuneration possibility is introduced at the cost of what 
authors can sell their rights for up front. It could be that the 
increased risk of the introduced lottery simply amplifies the 
“superstar effect,”237 with a positive effect on creation 
incentives. As discussed above, this positive effect necessarily 
assumes that authors value the chance probability of later 
payment more than what they lose in certain immediate 
payment, since introducing termination rights will lead to 
lower prices and/or less initial contracts.  
The payment possibility through termination rights is 
highly uncertain, and more than thirty-five years238 in the 
future. Exploring the concepts of decision-making under risk, 
and discounting future value, this Article has questioned 
whether the far-future payment has sufficient value to 
authors ex ante to be preferable to a higher buy-out price, and 
thus have a positive influence on their work. It is plausible 
that authors will discount this uncertain, far-future payment 
chance at the point in time of work creation, placing higher 
value on more immediate, certain payment.239 Additionally, 
since many authors will never see any of the money 
personally, even if their work is successful,240 it could also be 
  
 236. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344 
(2002); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 
433, 435 (2007). 
 237. See supra Part II.A; see also sources cited supra note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
 238. The chance of later profiting from future financial success of their works 
must be factored into their decision-making process before the work exists, in 
other words, well over thirty-five years in advance. The term for termination 
rights does not begin until the rights are transferred to another party, which is 
after the decision-making process to create the work occurs, and usually after the 
work itself has been created. 
 239. See supra Part II.D. 
 240. This is because, over thirty-five years down the road, it could just be an 
author’s rights-successors who profit. While some authors may value this equally, 
some may not, particularly since the statutory rights-successors are not 
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that the introduction of author termination rights reduces, 
rather than increases, ex ante incentives. 
This is not the first criticism of the policy assumption in 
copyright that author incentives are linear. For example, 
drawing on economic theories of predictive uncertainty, 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh argues that there are natural 
limits to what behavior the law can expect to incentivize 
through copyrights.241 Laws that attempt to correct for 
unanticipated value ex post assume that this value was 
foreseeable, and thus would be factored in by a rational actor 
and taken into account when deciding whether to invest in 
creating a work.242 But this foreseeablity could be limited.243 
Based on the incentive purpose of copyright law, it has 
also frequently been argued that unanticipated windfalls244 
should not be allocated to the author because they are 
unlikely to have influenced the decision to create the work.245 
Because of limited cognitive capability, or the above-
discussed factors, some gains are unlikely to be factored into 
authors’ decision-making, and it is questionable that these 
should automatically go to creators.246 The argument is that 
copyright law, like other areas of the law,247 should reflect 
  
necessarily to whom the author would prefer to bequeath his or her wealth. See 
supra Part II.D. 
 241. See Balganesh, supra note 119.  
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. at 1592. 
 244. A windfall is an unanticipated financial gain that comes about independent 
of work, planning, or any other socially desirable activity on the creator’s part. 
See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999). 
 245. See e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988); ABKCO Music, Inc. 
v. Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Platinum 
Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226, 227-28 (D.N.J. 1983); Kirke La 
Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 165-66 (N.Y. 1933). 
 246. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 119, at 1590 (discussing windfalls) (“In 
practical terms, copyright windfalls allow creators to engage in monopolistic 
pricing in new markets that are unlikely to have formed a crucial part of their 
incentives in creating the work. In addition, in relation to new uses and later-
developed technologies, these windfalls give creators control over markets that 
they clearly are not best positioned to develop.”). 
 247. For example, tort law. 
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what actually influences decision-making, rather than 
simply assuming that more gains equals more creation. To 
the extent that far-future gains are not relevant to the 
creation of artistic work, copyright policy should reconsider 
whether they are properly allocated or even necessary. 
While the argument is sometimes that the expectation is 
unlikely to influence an author’s incentive to create a work 
because of its highly uncertain nature,248 this Article 
recognizes that actors may factor in the probability of future 
gains, no matter their uncertainty. In other words, the 
uncertainty does not necessarily influence the assumption 
that the chance of high future earnings factors into a 
decision-making process at the outset of creation. Indeed, the 
theory of the “superstar effect” takes this into account. But 
because the introduction of termination rights increases risk 
at a price to the author, it becomes less effective when 
authors are risk-averse. Risk-averse actors will prefer certain 
to uncertain payment. This Article draws attention to the fact 
that actors in creative markets may be risk-averse, and may 
furthermore additionally discount values in the far future.249 
An incentive effect that is based on the predictive uncertainty 
of author termination rights thirty-five years down the road 
may be less strong than an incentive provided by anticipated 
immediate and more certain payment, even when such 
payment is smaller than the expected future remuneration.  
Even if author termination rights have a slightly positive 
effect on incentives, this must be weighed against other 
factors. This Article also looks at the potential for hold-up 
situations and their effect on investment incentives.250 Hold-
up, which is plausible in the termination right context, can 
reduce quality and distribution of artistic works, as well as 
hinder the development of new exploitation methods and 
technologies. This would neither be in authors’ nor in the 
  
 248. See Balganesh, supra note 119, at 1615 (discussing predictability) (“[A] 
creator’s belief that her work will come to be used in association with some wholly 
unforeseeable medium, merely because such unforeseeable media emerged in the 
past, represents an expectation that is not necessarily grounded in anything other 
than a bald prediction that a historical contingency is likely to repeat itself.”). 
 249. See supra Part II.D. 
 250. See supra Part II.B. 
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public’s best interest. Again, the utilitarian goal of the 
copyright system is to trade off exclusive rights in return for 
not just creation incentives, but also distribution of, and 
access to, artistic works.251 
While the law specifically intends to give authors the 
type of bargaining advantage seen in the hold-up scenario,252 
consideration of the effects on publisher investment seems to 
be lacking. The arguments of large publishing corporations 
in court are often not viewed particularly kindly by the 
general public, because it appears to be—and is likely—the 
case that they are trying everything they possibly can to 
protect their own financial interests. The argument of 
investment incentives, however, does line up with economic 
theory and should be weighted in policy decision-making.253 
This incentive structure essentially affects not just the 
financial gains of publishers, but also the interests of 
authors, and that of the general public. Intermediaries 
perform an essential role in both generating additional value 
of the work, and fostering public access. As mentioned above, 
the incentive system is primarily designed for this purpose, 
and not simply to remunerate authors.254 Quality, 
distribution, and investment in new media formats are 
things that benefit both authors and public interest.255 If 
copyright is intended to foster distribution and public access 
to artistic works, hold-up situations will be at odds with these 
  
 251. See supra Part II.B; see also Ashok Chandra, Crisis of Indefinite 
Consequence: How the Derivative Works Exception and the Lanham Act Undercut 
the Remunerative Value of Termination Transfers, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 250 (2005) (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, 
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“[R]eward to the author or artist serves to induce 
release to the public of the products of his creative genius.”)). 
 252. See infra Part III.B. 
 253. See supra Part II.B. 
 254. See supra Part II.D.2; see also Murray, supra note 72, at 415. 
 255. See DiCola, supra note 104, at 307. One cannot lose sight of the 
intermediaries’ function within the system. See id. (“[T]o fully understand 
copyright incentives, one must measure the financial rewards the intermediaries 
receive, the services they offer in terms of developing and disseminating works to 
the public, and how changes in the financial rewards to intermediaries are 
affecting the public’s access to creative works.”). 
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goals. This cost must thus be weighed against whatever 
benefits that author termination rights confer. 
Additionally, this Article looks at some behavioral 
economic factors that could come into play in the termination 
right context. One discussed effect that could impact 
distribution contracts is fairness preferences. If authors feel 
that a prospect of future compensation correction is more 
“fair” than a system without termination possibility, then 
more deals may be struck, even if these deals are at lower 
prices.256 Ex post, the fact that making use of the right to 
terminate requires an action, not to mention some effort, on 
the part of the authors or right successors could mean that 
the barrier to exercising author termination rights is higher 
than assumed.257 Both of these effects could mitigate some of 
the costs inherent to a termination rights system. 
Again, it is useful to remember that copyright laws are a 
tradeoff. Exclusive rights, and the possibility to capitalize on 
artistic works, are granted in order to correct for a market 
failure.258 This correction does not come without economic 
costs. Copyrights reduce the distribution and accessibility of 
works.259 Author termination rights, just like the copyrights 
they apply to, create economic inefficiencies, induce rent-
seeking behavior, and come with transaction costs.260 
Furthermore, this Article draws attention to the fact that 
termination rights induce price and risk-shifting that is not 
necessarily efficient and may add to this cost. It also 
  
 256. See supra Part II.E.1. 
 257. See supra Part II.E.2. 
 258. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 93, § 1.14; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, 
§1.03[A]. Copyright enables creators of artistic works to recoup production costs 
by creating exclusive rights on content so they can monetize it. Without this 
mechanism, the theory goes, content will be too easily replicated, eroding the 
creator’s profits and reducing the incentive to invest in creating content, resulting 
in market failure. See Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 326. 
 259. See Landes & Posner, supra note 110, at 326; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 93, § 
1.14. 
 260. Transaction costs are the costs incurred in performing market exchanges, 
frequently subcategorized as search and information costs, bargaining costs, and 
enforcement costs. See Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & 
ECON. 141, 148 (1979) (expanding on the original theory in Ronald H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960)). 
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demonstrates that hold-up situations could have negative 
effects on distribution and access to copyrighted works. While 
it is difficult to measure the costs and benefits conclusively,261 
this Article indicates that the relative weight of the costs is 
probably larger than the benefits. Author termination rights 
are likely to have a much smaller positive ex ante effect on 
creation incentives262 than the negative effects they 
introduce.  
However, investment incentives, while prevalent in U.S. 
copyright theory, are not everything. Another possible effect 
that copyright policy could be interested in fostering, even at 
the cost of some inefficiency, is wealth redistribution to 
authors. This is discussed in the following. 
B. Distributive Goals 
Another reason to grant author termination rights 
within copyright law serves distributive purposes. Policy 
makers may not care about incentives and instead be looking 
to achieve wealth redistribution.263 In many countries outside 
of the United States, the copyright system’s history and 
purpose is seen not as an incentive mechanism for the public 
benefit, but rather as a direct compensation mechanism for 
authors.264 Because authors have created something, the 
compensation falls first to them, as the originators of the 
work. Introducing author termination rights could 
  
 261. See David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 9 
(2004) (on the fact that copyright discourse is (necessarily) based on indication 
rather than empirical data). 
 262. If any at all. See supra Part II.D.  
 263. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 
83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1540-41 (2005). 
 264. For example, Germany. See, e.g., Schulbuch, Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 7, 1971, 31 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 229 (240) (Ger.); see also CATHARINA 
MARACKE, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DES URHEBERRECHTSGESETZES VON 1965 [THE 
FORMATION OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1965] 729 (2003) (Ger.); F. Willem 
Grosheide, Paradigm’s in Copyright Law, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON 
COPYRIGHT LAW 205, 207 (Brad Sherman & Alan Strowel eds., 1994); Murray, 
supra note 72, at 416. 
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potentially serve such distributive purposes, rather than 
utilitarian purposes.  
Indeed, looking at the documented debate and case law 
on the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, there are two main reasons 
given for the introduction of author termination rights. One 
argument is that authors are at a bargaining disadvantage 
with dealing with publishers.265 Allowing them a chance to 
terminate unremunerative agreements later on endeavors to 
reduce some of the publishers’ bargaining leverage.266 The 
other reason is the high uncertainty surrounding the success 
and failure of creative works.267 Because neither party is 
sufficiently able to foresee the future value of the copyright 
at the time of the agreement, the termination right serves to 
correct any imbalance caused by inaccurate predictions.  
Some prior literature, in answering the question of how 
the details of author termination rights are to be interpreted 
as the law comes into full effect over the next few years, bases 
its answer on either of these reasonings.268 Both of them are 
essentially distributive, because they intend to reallocate 
wealth to authors as the deserving or disadvantaged party. 
Based on the analysis in this Article, however, it seems that 
both the valuation problem and the issue of bargaining 
leverage are unfittingly addressed by termination rights. 
As seen above, the uncertain future value of artistic 
works makes it in the author’s interest to allocate the risk of 
success or failure to the publisher. It is one of the reasons 
why publishers exist in the first place. Allowing authors a 
termination right will reallocate part of the risk back to the 
  
 265. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985); Marvel 
Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 292 (2d Cir. 2002); H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 124 (1976); STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, 
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 31 
RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT 125 (Comm. Print 1961) (claiming “the author . . . is 
necessarily in a poor bargaining position”); see also Loren, Renegotiating, supra 
note 14, at 1345-46. 
 266. See STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 31 RENEWAL OF 
COPYRIGHT 125 (Comm. Print 1961); Loren, Renegotiating, supra note 14, at 1345-
46. 
 267. See Loren, Renegotiating, supra note 14, at 1346. 
 268. See Loren, Renegotiating, supra note 14; Menell & Nimmer, Judicial 
Resistance, supra note 15; Menell & Nimmer, Pooh-Poohing, supra note 14. 
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party least benefited by bearing it. Publishers will reduce 
what they are willing to pay for copyright grants, because the 
expected value is necessarily lower: they have no option to 
recoup money from the author when the work turns out to be 
unsuccessful, yet are subject to a shorter exploitation period 
when the value of the work turns out to be high. In the latter 
case, a small subset of highly successful authors (or their 
statutory successors) will get paid well the second time, but 
the majority will receive less ex ante. While this could 
theoretically fit into a utilitarian justification for termination 
rights, as discussed above, it is unlikely what Congress 
envisioned in their focus on the disadvantaged creator. 
Authors are essentially giving up part of their initial 
payment in return for a highly uncertain chance of reward 
thirty-five years down the road.269 If the intent behind the law 
is to correct the “imbalance” that results from the difficulty 
of predicting a work’s success, it is questionable whether this 
is actually achieved by giving only (successful) authors and 
statutory successors the possibility to negotiate for more 
money ex post. 
This brings us to the other argument of bargaining 
leverage. It could be plausible that authors are generally at 
a bargaining disadvantage in dealing with publishers in 
practice.270 For example, a limited number of publishers in a 
market will create imbalances in negotiating with a far 
larger number of authors.271 Large numbers of actors in a 
market can band together to increase their leverage, and 
authors’ guilds may be effectual in some industries. Yet the 
stories of bought-out authors are persistent272 and it 
thinkable that allowing these particular authors a 
  
 269. And quite possibly not until after their death. 
 270. See Darling, supra note 98, at 506-15; see also sources cited supra note 265. 
But see Rub, supra note 15, at 78-85 (rejecting the notion of authors as the weaker 
party in some, but not all, creative industries). 
 271. Both bargaining theory and experimental evidence indicate that 
competition plays a role in price negotiation. See, e.g., Brit Grosskopf, 
Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder 
Competition, 6 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 141 (2003); see also sources cited supra note 
95.  
 272. See id. 
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termination right will give them more leverage in a second 
negotiation.273 The above-discussed effects indicate, however, 
that this will only benefit a small subset of highly successful 
authors and come at the expense of the rest. Authors who 
have been successful for such a long period of time will often 
not need additional bargaining power, because they are now 
Bob Dylan, for example. In many cases, this will not even be 
the original author, but rather the statutory successors. If it 
turns out that authors as a group lose bargaining power and 
part of their income in the initial copyright assignments,274 
the argument that termination rights generally give authors 
more leverage needs to be relativized. 
In essence, no matter which of these two justifications 
one chooses, if the effect of this law is to reduce the initial 
prices that authors can sell their copyrights for, as well as 
shift the burden of risk back to them, then this outcome poses 
the question whether the rule is performing its distributive 
function as intended.  
C. Outlook 
This Article indicates that the introduction of author 
termination rights is neither in the interest of distributive-
oriented nor utilitarian-oriented copyright policy. The 
normative implication of this result would be to eliminate 
author termination rights in United States copyright law and 
look for alternative ways to achieve the goals of the 
legislature, should such goals still be preferred. Because a 
legislative solution is difficult to bring about,275 this Section 
turns to ways in which the negative effects of termination 
rights could be reduced within the given legislative 
framework. As seen above, termination rights will be subject 
to considerable judicial interpretation in the near future. 
There is some leeway with regard to the strictness of their 
  
 273. Particularly in the case of relationship-specific investments on the part of 
the publisher. See supra Part II.B. 
 274. For a general discussion on the effects of economic price changes and risk 
allocation, see supra Part II.A. 
 275. See infra note 276. 
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application, essentially allowing courts to influence some of 
the costs of author termination rights. 
Returning to the open legal questions addressed in the 
first Part of this Article, courts will soon be asked to decide 
on issues like the boundaries of works made for hire and 
inalienability. Assuming we stay within the given framework 
of the law,276 this Article indicates that a narrow 
interpretation of author termination rights may be in the 
interest of both utilitarian and distributive-based policies. 
Rather than deciding based on anecdotes of disadvantaged 
artists at the mercy of publishing conglomerates,277 courts can 
take economic factors into account in their decision-making. 
This would mean interpreting the inalienability of 
termination rights narrowly, declaring rescissions and 
copyright re-grants valid in certain cases.278 It would also 
mean not hesitating to apply the work made for hire doctrine 
where it makes economic sense to do so.279 Judicial 
interpretation can establish the boundaries of the rights, 
setting legal precedence for times to come. In the context of 
author termination rights, courts thus have some space to 
influence the above-discussed costs and benefits of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article contributes to the ongoing debate 
surrounding author termination rights by providing further 
economic insight. U.S. law grants authors a contract 
termination right thirty-five years after the license or 
transfer of their copyrights. This Article argues that, from an 
  
 276. Others have made suggestions to change the legislation, e.g. Rub argues 
for shortening the time period before termination of transfer can be exercised and 
restructuring the copyright post-termination as a liability versus a property rule. 
See Rub, supra note 15, at 123. The insights from this Article support these 
suggestions. However, its policy recommendations (to the extent that they are 
made) remain focused on the given framework and what immediate changes are 
possible and realistic (i.e. common-law judicial interpretation in the many cases 
on the immediate horizon that will set precedents). 
 277. See Murray, supra note 72, at 424 (discussing courts’ observable tendency 
to be influenced by such concerns); see also McGilvray, supra note 83, at 333-36. 
 278. See Rub, supra note 15, at 113-14. 
 279. See, e.g., Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 777 F. Supp. 2d 720, 749-50 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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economic perspective, author termination rights are likely 
not desirable for authors, publishers, or the general public. 
Price changes, risk-shifting, hold-up problems, and skewed 
incentive structures raise questions about the distributive 
policy argument of author termination rights, and put them 
at odds with the utilitarian purpose of U.S. copyright law.  
